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NONEXCLUDABLE SURGICAL METHOD PATENTS
JONAS ANDERSON*
ABSTRACT
A patent consists of only one right: the right to exclude others from
practicing the patented invention. However, one class of patents
statutorily lacks the right to exclude direct infringers: surgical
method patents are not enforceable against medical practitioners or
health care facilities, which are the only realistic potential direct
infringers of such patents. Despite this, inventors regularly file for
(and receive) surgical method patents. Why would anyone incur the
expense (more than $20,000 on average) of acquiring a patent on a
surgical method if that patent cannot be used to keep people from
using the patent?
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The traditional answer is that although the patent statute
forecloses enforcement of surgical method patents against doctors, it
does allow for contributory liability of such patents by medical device
manufacturers. However, this Article provides evidence of completely
nonexcludable surgical method patents—patents in which direct
infringers are statutorily protected from liability and contributory
infringers do not exist. These nonexcludable patents challenge the
widely held view that the only reason an inventor would incur the
cost of patenting is to acquire the right to exclude.
To explain the existence and appeal of nonexcludable patents, this
Article looks to patent-signaling theory and personhood theory of real
property. Essentially, some inventors patent because they want to
signal others about some aspect of the invention or the inventor.
While other inventors acquire these nonexcludable patents because
the invention forms part of the inventor’s “public persona.”
There are doctrinal payoffs to this theoretical insight as well. For
instance, inventors who approach the patent system from a person-
hood angle bring with them a completely different set of costs and
benefits than those traditionally assumed. To these inventors, the
primary benefit of the patent system is the public disclosure that
patenting provides. This contradicts almost all extant patent the-
ories, which consider disclosure to be the primary cost that inventors
seek to avoid. As such, this Article provides a novel understanding
about the motivation to patent, an understanding that is much more
concerned with knowledge dissemination and recognition for creation
of that knowledge than with exclusive rights.
2020] NONEXCLUDABLE SURGICAL METHOD PATENTS 639
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640
I. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE OF A PATENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 648
A. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655
1. Enactment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655
2. Litigation Surrounding § 287(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659
B. The Existence of Nonexcludable Patents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 662
II. WHY DO INVENTORS PURSUE NONEXCLUDABLE 
PATENTS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
A. Exclusive Rights Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
1. Ignorance of the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
2. Better Safe than Sorry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
3. Targeting Contributory Infringers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 667
B. Nonexclusive Rights Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 669
1. Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 669
2. Personhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 672
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NONEXCLUDABLE PATENTS. . . . . . . . 677
A. Theoretical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677
B. Doctrinal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681
1. Operability Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682
2. Radical Changes to the Patent System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689
640 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:637
INTRODUCTION
In a well-known article, Patent Signals, Clarisa Long attacked the
belief that patents are valuable to inventors only as a means of
monopolizing an inventive idea.1 She argued that patents offer more
than simply the exclusive right to make and use a patented idea.2
Patents, she argued, can serve as a signal of the patent holder’s
innovative nature, investment-worthiness, or some other difficult to
ascertain characteristic.3
Long’s conception of a patent’s private value has provided depth
to our collective understanding of the patent system.4 Even so,
Long’s attack does not go far enough. Long’s work challenges the
idea that the right to exclude is “the alpha and the omega” of a
patent’s private value,5 but it does not suggest that the right to
exclude is irrelevant to patentees.6 Far from it, Long, and those who
have followed her, assume that inventors primarily desire a patent’s
right to exclude. Any signaling benefits that a patent possesses are
merely extra reasons to patent.7 Because of this focus on exclusive
1. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002) (“[C]halleng[ing] the
traditional assumption that exclusivity is the alpha and the omega of the private value of
patent rights.”).
2. Id. (“The ability to convey information credibly to observers at low cost is a highly
valuable function of patents that has been completely overlooked in the literature.”).
3. See id. at 645-46 (discussing, for example, the conception of a patent as a means of
reducing information asymmetries between firms).
4. See Annamaria Conti et al., Patents as Signals for Startup Financing, 61 J. INDUS.
ECON. 592, 594, 618 (2013) (arguing that Long’s theory is correct as a means of reducing
informational asymmetries for startup financing); Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Timo Fischer,
Venture Debt Financing: Determinants of the Lending Decision, 10 STRATEGIC ENTRE-
PRENEURSHIP J. 235, 252 (2016) (applying Long’s insight to venture debt financing); Gideon
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (2005)
(building on Long’s theory to arrive at the authors’ patent portfolio theory); Dirk Czarnitzki
et al., Patents as Quality Signals? The Implications for Financing Constraints on R&D 8 (Nat’l
Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19947, 2014) (finding that Long’s theory holds
true more for small firms than for larger ones).
5. Long, supra note 1, at 627.
6. See id. at 679 (concluding that patents have value “above and beyond” the value of the
rents obtained through the patent’s right to exclude); id. at 637 (“I want to make clear at the
outset what I am not arguing. First, I am not arguing that the right to exclude is not a valu-
able stick in the proverbial bundle of intellectual property rights.”).
7. See, e.g., id. at 637; Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 20-27 (reviewing
scholarly answers to the “patent paradox,” all of which involve some desire to obtain a patent’s
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rights, scholars have generally not considered that some inventors
seek nonexcludable patents. Why would anyone go to the expense
of acquiring a patent that cannot exclude others from practicing the
invention?
This Article suggests that a number of patentees seek out and
obtain patents that lack the right to exclude. In order to make this
argument, this Article relies on a unique quirk of the United States
patent system.8 Unlike every other country in the world, the United
States grants patents on surgical methods, yet protects direct
infringers from liability.9 Thus, U.S. surgical method patents are
unenforceable against direct infringers. Of course, surgical meth-
od patents may be enforceable against contributory infringers.
Contributory infringement occurs when one supplies a substantial
component of the patented invention, where the component has no
substantial, noninfringing use.10 However, some surgical method
patents do not have a realistic contributory infringer.11 These
surgical method patents, which are unable to snare a contributory
infringer, are nonexcludable: that is, they are unable to restrict
others from practicing the invention.
Why would an inventor obtain a nonexcludable patent? After all,
patents are relatively expensive to obtain.12 Patent scholars have
right to exclude).
8. See Luis Gil Abinader & Jorge L. Contreras, The Patentability of Genetic Therapies:
CAR-T and Medical Treatment Exclusions Around the World, 34 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 705, 729-
31 (2019) (surveying the law of other countries and concluding that the United States is
unique in its treatment of surgical method patent enforceability); Priyanka Rastogi, World
Wide Legal Status of Medical Method Patents: An Overview, MONDAQ (May 6, 2014), http://
www.mondaq.com/india/x/311404/Patent/World+Wide+Legal+Stat [https://perma.cc/D66P-
HXJN].
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012); see also Abinader & Contreras, supra note 8, at 730-31;
Todd Martin, Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: A Comparative Study, 82 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 381, 400-06 (2000) (analyzing the United States’ unique treatment
of medical treatment patents).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (holding liable as a contributory infringer one that (a) practices a
“component” of a patented invention, (b) wherein that component is a “material” part of the
invention, (c) has knowledge that the component is “especially” made for infringement, and
(d) does not produce a staple good with “substantial non-infringing use[s]”).
11. For an example of such a patent, see U.S. Patent No. 8,974,442 (filed Mar. 20, 2009);
see also infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
12. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 15 & n.52 (stating that the cost of filing,
attorney fees, and various maintenance fees associated with a patent total between $10,000
and $30,000).
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not considered the possibility of an inventor knowingly seeking out
a nonexcludable patent. In fact, much of patent theory explicitly
rejects the idea that an inventor would seek out nonexcludable
patents as a mistake. Most commentary on the private value of
obtaining patents assumes that the right to exclude is the patentee’s
objective.13 It is thought that without the prospect of obtaining the
right to exclude others from the invention (in reality, the rents
promised by those exclusive rights), an inventor would be better off
keeping his invention a secret or not bothering to invent in the first
place.14 It is odd, therefore, that inventors would seek to obtain
these nonexcludable patents on surgical techniques.
This Article examines potential explanations for why patentees
obtain nonexcludable surgical method patents, some of which
comport with the exclusive rights paradigm and some of which do
not. There are some reasons for obtaining these patents which
follow the exclusive rights paradigm. For instance, inventors may
desire the patent’s right to exclude, but are misinformed about the
enforceability of surgical method patents against likely infringers.
13. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (describing the patent system as
“a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge”); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW
OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 21 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup) (discussing the
“exchange-for-secrets” theory of the patent system); Colleen V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent
Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1867 (2016) (stating that “the defining right of a patent”
is the right to exclude); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 439, 456 (2004) (“Unlike mineral claims, which confer the positive rights of possession
and enjoyment, patents grant only the negative right of exclusion.”); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21-22 (1984) (observing
that inventors would not make information public without the promise of compensation);
Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643, 1650-53
(2010) (proposing that the scope of the right to exclude ought to be narrower); Long, supra
note 1, at 628 (“The right to exclude others is frequently described as the most important stick
in the bundle of private property rights.”); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom,
Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 711 (1986) (“The right to
exclude others has often been cited as the most important characteristic of private property.”).
14. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 956-60
(2011) (discussing why private inventors may choose trade secrecy over patent protection);
David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 64
(1991) (“Inventors choose trade secret protection when they believe that patent protection is
too costly relative to the value of their invention, or that it will give them a reward sub-
stantially less than the benefit of their invention (as reflected, in part, in the length of time
before any else [sic] will invent it), either because the invention is not patentable or because
the length (or other conditions) of patent protection is insufficient.”).
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Or, alternatively, the patentee might be fully aware that her patent
is unenforceable, but she acquires it anyway in hopes that a po-
tential infringer will still be dissuaded from infringing. Yet, these
explanations fail to give a realistic picture of the typical patentee or
the ethical obligations of patent attorneys.15
A further potential exclusive-rights-based explanation for why
parties obtain nonexcludable patents posits that inventors know
the law, but patent anyway because they are protecting themselves
in the event that the law changes to allow patent suits against
physicians.16 Yet, this too is an unsatisfactory explanation for
why inventors obtain surgical method patents, because the cost
of obtaining a patent is likely too high to serve merely as a hedge
against the unlikely event of congressional modification to the
patent statute.17
More likely explanations exist for the continued interest in
obtaining nonexcludable patents, but those explanations exist
15. For a patent attorney, failing to inform one’s client (who is seeking a patent on a
method of surgery) about the unenforceability of a patent likely amounts to malpractice and
is unlikely to explain the amount of unenforceable surgical method patents acquired. See A.
Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice: An Oxymoron No More, U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y
1, 19 (2004) (stating that the malpractice standard for patent attorneys is that they “should
exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by [patent] attorneys under similar
circumstances” (emphasis omitted)).
16. As an interesting example of where the hope for legislative change has led to patent
filings, consider the recent easing of marijuana prohibitions by states. See, e.g., Christine
Hauser, Marijuana Embraced in Michigan, Utah and Missouri, but Rejected in North Dakota,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/michigan-marijua
na-legalization.html [https://perma.cc/43TB-8P3G] (reporting on the result of recent ballot
initiatives on medical marijuana). This has led to calls for loosening of federal laws. See
Naomi Martin & James Pindell, All 2020 Presidential Candidates Now Support Marijuana
Legalization Efforts—Even the Republicans, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.boston
globe.com/news/marijuana/2019/02/26/all-presidential-candidates-support-legalizing-
marijuana-even-republicans/bK4sQjPIgkzm54kl0dmZoI/story.html [https://perma.cc/GD73-
NM2K]. Patent filings around cannabis have also spiked in the past few years. See, e.g., Alicia
Wallace, Patent No. 6,630,507: Why the U.S. Government Holds a Patent on Cannabis Plant
Compounds, DENV. POST (Aug. 28, 2016), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/08/28/what-is-mar
ijuana-patent-6630507/ [https://perma.cc/3DMN-AUGX] (reporting on the U.S. government’s
own patent holdings around cannabis). But anticipating that the federal prohibition on
marijuana will be repealed, filing for patents on cannabis technology is a much safer bet than
doing so on the hope that the surgical method unenforceability will be repealed. There has
never, to my knowledge, been a proposed bill that would have rescinded 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)
(2012).
17. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 15 (estimating that the cost of ob-
taining a patent is between $10,000 and $30,000).
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outside of the exclusive rights paradigm. These explanations are
found in patent-signaling theory as well as personhood theory of
property.18
Signaling theory holds that a patent’s private value is measured
not only by the rents that can be acquired from the right to exclude,
but also by the value that a patent has in conveying hard-to-
measure attributes about its owner.19 This signaling can be valu-
able in securing investment from outside firms because these firms
may have difficulty reliably distinguishing innovative companies
from noninnovative ones.20 To the extent that patents serve as a
rough proxy for innovativeness, they can be worthwhile to acquire
for the ability that they have to attract investors who are seeking
innovative investment opportunities.21
For surgeons, this signaling benefit of patenting can exist in
many forms. For example, surgeons are often “user innova-
tors”—consumers of products or techniques who subsequently
reinvent or redesign the techniques used in surgery.22 Because
surgeons have firsthand knowledge regarding how to improve the
surgical environment, surgeons are oftentimes better sources of
surgical improvements than product manufacturers.23 For surgeons
who develop patentable surgical methods, patents may serve as a
vehicle for diffusing the knowledge of the new method and identify-
ing the patentee as the source of that knowledge.24 Furthermore, the
patent can signal the surgeon’s status as an innovator to companies
18. See Long, supra note 1, at 637.
19. Id. at 627-28.
20. Id. at 672-73 (“Because patents are useful in reducing informational asymmetries
between firms and capital markets, we would expect firms to care more about patent signaling
when informational asymmetries are large and when alternative means of conveying infor-
mation credibly are limited.”).
21. See id. at 672 (“Start-up firms and firms engaging in research projects that are
difficult to value would particularly benefit from mechanisms that allow them to convey
credible information about their positive attributes to their relevant audiences.”).
22. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1 (2005) (“[U]sers of products and
services—both firms and individual consumers—are increasingly able to innovate for them-
selves.”).
23. See id. at 30 (reporting on the findings of a survey of surgeons, in which “22 percent
reported developing or improving some item(s) of medical equipment for use in their own
practices”).
24. For more on patent law’s knowledge dissemination, see Sean B. Seymore, The
Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 656-57 (2010) (discussing patents
as a source of technical knowledge).
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interested in collaborating with an innovative surgeon, either to
develop and market new products or to design courses to convey
knowledge about the patented method to colleagues.25
The widespread adoption of a new surgical technique can have
pecuniary benefits, as well as psychic ones, for the inventor.26 Often,
surgeons who develop a new way of performing surgery offer classes
that demonstrate the new technique for other surgeons in the field.27
These courses can be very profitable.28 A patent can serve as a
signal to course participants that the instructor is the inventor of
the technique and therefore the best source for information about
the intricacies of the surgery.29
The personhood theory of real property law provides another
explanation for the appeal of nonexcludable patents. First proposed
by Freidrich Hegel30 and later expanded upon by Margaret Jane
Radin,31 personhood theory has been used by scholars to explain
other areas of intellectual property (particularly copyright),32 but
25. See, e.g., Christopher Lettl et al., Users’ Contributions to Radical Innovation: Evidence
from Four Cases in the Field of Medical Equipment Technology, 36 R&D MGMT. 251, 259
(2006) (finding that surgeons possess “sticky” knowledge that product manufacturers cannot
acquire on their own without substantial investment).
26. See Ofer Tur-Sinai, Beyond Incentives: Expanding the Theoretical Framework for
Patent Law Analysis, 45 AKRON L. REV. 243, 280-81 (2012).
27. For example, Dr. John Chao is the inventor of Patents 8,007,278 and 8,202,092. U.S
Patent Nos. 8,007,278 & 8,202,092 (filed Aug. 3, 2006 & Sept. 17, 2008, respectively). These
patents cover a method for performing periodontal surgery and an instrument for performing
such surgery. See A Quick and Easy Option to Correct Gum Recession, CHAO PINHOLE,
https://pinholesurgicaltechnique.com [https://perma. cc/4M9V-GH3H]. Dr. Chao offers a course
for dentists interested in his technique. The cost of the two-day seminar is $6500. Register/
Program Overview, CHAO PINHOLE, https://pinholesurgicaltechnique.com/register/ [https://
perma.cc/4E6U-QQWV].
28. Register/Program Overview, supra note 27.
29. See, e.g., John K. Zalesky, A Team Effort, Part 1, AESTHETICDENTISTRY (Nov. 22,
2018), https://adentmag.com/a-team-effort-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/ZUE3-JUU4].
30. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 45 (S. W. Dyde trans., Prometheus Books
1996) (1896).
31. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957
(1982) (proposing a personhood theory of property, wherein some control over resources in a
person’s external environment is necessary for proper self-development and noting how such
a theory is often implicit in court opinions and commentaries, yet ignored in legal thought).
32. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 329
(1988) (stating his personal belief that intellectual property “need[s] the support of a
personality theory, such as the one proposed by Hegel, in which property is justified as an
expression of the self”); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257-58 (2006) (urging a
“cultural” theory of intellectual property, partially relying on Radin’s personhood theory).
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the theory has received only passing treatment in patent law.33 The
few treatments of personhood theory and patent law focus on the
right to exclude as enhancing the inventor’s persona.34
The few extant treatments of personhood theory can provide
insights into why inventors obtain nonexcludable surgical method
patents. If an inventor views herself as an inventor, a patent (even
a nonexcludable one) is a means of “developing and realizing one’s
personality.”35 For some surgeons, it is irrelevant that surgical pat-
ents lack the right to exclude. These patentees may be searching for
nonpecuniary benefits when they file a patent application. The re-
alization of a surgeon’s persona that occurs through recognition
from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as
an inventor may be of such worth that those surgeon-inventors are
willing to go to the expense of patenting.36
Interestingly, if the existence of certain patents is best explained
by signaling or personhood theory, then the disclosure theory of
patents has a much larger role to play in patent doctrine than it
currently enjoys.37 The disclosure theory adopts the classic quid pro
quo narrative of why we have a patent system: the inventor informs
the public of how the invention works and in exchange, the public
offers a limited-in-time right to exclude.38 Here, too, the excludabili-
ty of patents is thought to be essential.39
However, there is no reason to so limit disclosure theory to the
pursuit of exclusive rights. As long as the public is getting its part
33. See Ayn Rand, Patents and Copyrights, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 125 (5th
ed. 1966) (“Patents and copyrights are the legal implementation of the base of all property
rights: a man’s right to the product of his mind.”); Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The
Right Not to Use in Property and Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1466-70 (2013)
(analyzing whether the personhood theory supports nonuse of a patented invention); Tur-
Sinai, supra note 26, at 276-81 (stating the case for the application of personality theory to
patents).
34. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 26, at 281 (“The personality theory thus provides an
additional justification for the exclusive rights granted to an inventor under the patent
system.”).
35. Id. at 274.
36. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 35 (4th ed. 2017) (describing the
disclosure theory of patent law).
38. Id.
39. Id. (“[T]he prospect of a property right will induce inventors to seek patent protection,
and thereby disclose their inventions in accordance with patent law’s disclosure require-
ments.”).
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of the bargain (the quid), what the patentee receives from the public
(the quo) ought to be irrelevant. By simply enlarging the range of
possible motivations for seeking patent protection beyond merely
exclusive rights,40 disclosure theory comports with signaling and
personhood patents.
By envisioning a broader spectrum of motivations to acquire
patents, however, we must enforce more strictly the doctrines that
police the amount of disclosure required in a patent.41 If the gov-
ernment is granting nonexcludable rights that nonetheless signal
something to the public or that are imprimaturs of the inventor’s
innovativeness, we ought to require more proof of the operability
and value of the invention than we currently require. Thus, the
USPTO ought to raise the utility standard and, in particular, the
doctrine of patent operability in areas that have a high rate of
signaling or personhood patents.42
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I introduces the non-
excludable surgical method patent. This Part provides an overview
of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c): both its enactment by Congress and the sub-
sequent litigation over the statute. This overview demonstrates that
surgical method patents cannot exclude those who directly practice
the invention (by statute)43 nor do they exclude contributory in-
fringers in some cases.44 This Part concludes with examples of non-
excludable surgical method patents.
Then, Part II turns to the question of why patentees would ob-
tain such nonexcludable patents. After finding that traditional ex-
clusive rights theories lack explanatory power, this Part turns to
two theories (one from patent law and one from property law) to
40. See id.
41. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible
Subject Matter Restrictions, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 267, 286-93 (2015) (listing potential
theories for subject matter eligibility that would promote innovation).
42. See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the USPTO has the
initial burden of challenging the operability of an invention); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he PTO has the initial burden of challenging a presumptively correct
assertion of utility in the disclosure.” (citing In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A.
1971))). For a good overview of the utility standard (including operability), see Michael Risch,
A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 65-68 (2011).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). Surgical method patents are also statutorily unenforceable against
inducers. Id.; see also id. § 271(b).
44. Id. § 271(c).
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explain the existence of nonexcludable surgical method patents.
Patent law’s signaling theory and property law’s personhood theory
serve as this Article’s theoretical foundation. Part III of this Article
then examines the doctrinal and theoretical implications of
signaling and personhood patents.
I. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE OF A PATENT
Academic scholarship on patent law has been very interested
with the question of “why do inventors patent?”45 Yet, generally,
there is little mystery as to why someone would desire to obtain a
patent: a patent grants to the inventor an exclusive right over the
invention.46 The predominant theories about the patent system
predict that without rights to exclude, inventors will choose not to
enter the patent system.47 Without rights to exclude, inventors
would either (a) rely on trade secret protection for their inventions,48
or (b) not invent in the first place because others will copy their
inventions.49
This Article asks a different version of that fundamental ques-
tion: Why would an inventor patent if the patent is nonexcludable?50
45. See generally Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063 (2008) (asking why start-ups patent); Petra Moser, How Do Patent
Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs, 95 AM. ECON.
REV. 1214 (2005) [hereinafter Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation?] (asking why
inventors from certain countries patent more frequently than inventors from other countries);
Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. Powell, To Patent or Not: Faculty Decisions and Institutional
Success at Technology Transfer, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 99 (2001) (asking why some uni-
versities patent more than others); Petra Moser, Why Don’t Inventors Patent? (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,294, 2007) [hereinafter Moser, Why Don’t Investors
Patent?] (asking why certain industries prefer trade secrecy to patents).
46. See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law, 30
AM. ECON. REV. 475, 476 (1940) (“To encourage invention, the State grants to the inventor a
monopoly right to manufacture, use, and sell his creation.”).
47. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 928.
48. If trade secret protection is available, it is oftentimes preferable to patent protection
for a number of reasons: (1) to claim a trade secret an inventor need not (in fact, cannot)
disclose her invention, whereas patent protection requires disclosure; and (2) a trade secret
can potentially last forever, whereas patents are limited to twenty years. See id. at 923-27
(listing the legal differences between patent protection and trade secret protection).
49. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent
Protection and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 987, 991 (2000).
50. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology, 19 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1119, 1135-36 (2012) (defining “worthless” patents as those with such amorphous
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The U.S. patent system is a voluntary regime.51 The patent sys-
tem’s very existence depends upon inventors choosing to publicly
divulge valuable secrets about their inventions and paying for the
privilege to do so.52 The cost of doing so can be very high: the cost of
developing individual inventions (a new drug, for instance) can be
in the tens of millions of dollars.53 Furthermore, the cost of obtain-
ing the patent can exceed $20,000.54
Without the patent system, many inventions would remain se-
crets.55 With no promise of a patent, inventors would prefer to
practice the invention in secret rather than inform the public of the
invention’s existence.56 Inventions that could not be kept as trade
secrets would be underproduced or, worse, not invented at all.57 This
boundaries that identifying and defending those boundaries would cost more than the value
of the patent); Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis
of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1736 (2000) (describing worthless patents as
those dealing with obsolete technology); Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1521, 1529, 1551-52 (2005) (describing as “worthless” those patents that expire
before the first maintenance fee period). By “nonexcludable patents,” I am not referring to the
all-too-common situation in which the marketplace places no value on an invention. This is
a situation where nonexcludability arises because there is no one to exclude: no one desires
to practice the patent. See Kitch, supra, at 1729-30 (explaining the assumption that valuable
patents create monopolies); Moore, supra, at 1548, 1550-51 (explaining that maintenance of
the patent indicates value to the patent holder). Instead, this Article defines a nonexcludable
patent as a patent that is unenforceable against any realistic infringer. Thus, in contradis-
tinction to all other extant literature, this Article examines patents that are unenforceable
before they are filed. See, e.g., Moore, supra, at 1551.
51. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 922-23.
52. See Seymore, supra note 24, at 622 n.1 (“[C]ourts often refer to disclosure as the quid
pro quo for the inventor’s right to exclude.” (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63
(1998))).
53. Indeed, for pharmaceuticals the number may be even higher. The Tufts Center for the
Study of Drug Development estimates that new drugs cost $1.4 billion to develop. See Rick
Mullin, Tufts Study Finds Big Rise in Cost of Drug Development, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014), https://cen.acs.org/articles/92/web/2014/11/Tufts-Study-Finds-Big-Rise.
html [https://perma.cc/TFU4-RS5A] (estimating that new drug development costs are $2.6
billion, $1.4 billion of which are examining new drug candidates and $1.2 billion of which are
opportunity costs).
54. See supra note 12.
55. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 928; Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Inno-
vation?, supra note 45, at 1233 (suggesting that “the introduction of strong patent laws may
trigger changes in the direction of innovative activity”); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1974) (discussing what factors influence an inventor’s choice of
patenting or secrecy).
56. See Moser, Why Don’t Inventors Patent?, supra note 45, at 1-2.
57. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 13-14 (stating that the standard
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is because without the patent system, there would be no reward for
the costly process of inventing in the first place.58 The inventor
would bear the costs of discovery and invention, while free riders
would quickly copy and produce identical products without the up-
front invention costs.59
Besides motivating inventors to invent, the patent system also
facilitates public disclosure of those inventions.60 The patent system
performs its public disclosure function by offering a limited-in-time
monopoly over the right to make, use, offer to sell, sell, or import
the invention.61 Obviously, this right to exclude is appealing to
inventors and potential investors.62 The right to exclude is thus
thought to be fundamental to a functioning patent system.63
Inventors desire the right to exclude and they are willing to publicly
disclose their inventions.64 Courts often refer to this exchange of
exclusive rights for inventive knowledge as the patent quid pro
quo.65
justification for the patent system supposes that in the absence of the patent system, “inven-
tors would likely put their creative skills to rest and too few inventions would be produced”).
58. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1054-55 (2005).
59. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 49, at 991 (“The incentive theory correctly states that
patent protection stimulates private investment by warding off low-cost imitators and
promising monopolistic profits that will at least cover product development costs.”).
60. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 928.
61. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). For the majority of patents issued nowadays, the patent
lasts for twenty years from the earliest U.S. or international date of filing. Id. § 154(a)(2).
There may be extensions beyond the twenty-year period for certain patents that experience
processing delays at the USPTO. See id. § 154(b)(1)(A). Or, in order to compensate for related
Food and Drug Administration approval, see id. § 156. See also Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80
F.3d 1543, 1546-47 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Conversely, there are certain patents that have a shorter
life than twenty years from filing. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF
PATENTING EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2701 (9th ed. 2014) (explaining that if a patent is
obvious in light of an earlier-issued patent (so-called “double patenting”), then the patent
expires on the date of expiration of the earlier-issued patent).
62. See Lemley, supra note 58, at 1054.
63. See id.
64. See Moore, supra note 50, at 1550-51 (noting that patent maintenance fees are
indicative of the long-term value of patents); Petra Moser, What Do Inventors Patent? 16
(March 24, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://web.mit.edu/moser/www/patrat603.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JHP7-8QSV].
65. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 125 (2006)
(“One fundamental premise of patent law, according to the courts, is that the system is a quid
pro quo between the state and the inventor; in exchange for disclosing his invention in the
patent itself, the inventor is granted the right to exclude others from practicing the invention
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The patent quid pro quo is fundamental to courts’ understanding
of why the patent system exists.66 Despite the importance of the
patent quid pro quo, courts rarely analyze the presence of the
exclusive rights in the exchange (the quo in the patent quid pro
quo).67 Courts spend a great deal of time analyzing whether the
patentee has something of value to exchange, rigorously examining
the doctrines of written description, utility, and enablement.68 Yet
courts do not have any doctrines that analyze the sufficiency of the
exclusive rights given to the patentee.
That courts ignore the quo that the inventor receives in the
patent bargain actually makes some sense. After all, why would
someone incur the expense of acquiring a patent and disclosing the
process of making the invention unless the inventor were getting
something of greater value in exchange? The patent system is a
voluntary system; thus, if the inventor is receiving a lesser value
than he is providing, he can simply choose not to participate.69 It
costs around $20,000 to file and prosecute a patent70 and about two
years for the USPTO to examine and (potentially) grant a patent.71
It makes sense that there would need to be some monetary reward
at the end of such an arduous process to justify the expense. Courts
have merely assumed that the reward is the right to exclude and
that reward is present in every patent.72
for a limited time.”); see also John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2013) (stating that the quid pro quo of the patent system has been
confused by courts during the last fifty years).
66. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system represents
a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new
and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period
of time.”).
67. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 497 n.2 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (citing “the economic quid pro quo underlying patent protection; i. e., a monopoly
limited in time, in return for full disclosure of the invention” as an incentive to patent
inherent in patent law).
68. See John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent
Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 612 (2016).
69. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 922-23.
70. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 28 n.100.
71. According to the USPTO, the average patent spends twenty-two months in exami-
nation. How Long Does It Take to Get a Patent: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,
https://www.upcounsel.com/how-long-does-it-take-to-get-a-patent [https://perma.cc/D58R-
DBDY].
72. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (“Patents are not
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Patent scholars, with few exceptions, have also focused on the
patent’s right to exclude as the primary motivator for inventors
choosing to undertake the expensive process to acquire a patent.73
There are various (often contradictory) utilitarian explanations for
the existence of the patent system.74 However, all of these utili-
tarian-based approaches assume that the patent’s right to exclude
is the prize that inventors are seeking when they patent. All util-
itarian theories of the patent system presuppose that the inventor
seeks the patent’s right to exclude. The various theories differ only
in how they describe the benefits that the public acquires from
patenting. In essence, the various theories are unanimous about
what the patentee receives (exclusive rights) but differ in what they
view as the benefit to the public in the patent quid pro quo.75
For example, let us examine the various utilitarian theories for
the patent system. One prominent theory that is especially popular
with courts—disclosure theory—says that the public gains new
knowledge because of inventors’ desire to acquire the right to
exclude.76 Disclosure theorists posit that the benefit of having a
given as favors ... but are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the
right, limited to a term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his
invention.”).
73. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 697-98 & n.2 (2001) (stating that the “consensus” among
patent scholars is a utilitarian-based approach, and that such an approach depends on the
patent’s right to exclude to incentivize creation, disclosure, and commercialization of the
invention); Sean B. Seymore, Patenting the Unexplained, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 707, 713 (2019)
(“What the patentee gets [from patenting] is the limited period of exclusivity conferred by the
patent grant.”).
74. See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, The Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV.
297, 303-09 (2015) (describing various utilitarian-based theories supporting the existence of
the patent system).
75. See, e.g., id.; Seymore, supra note 73, at 713 (“What the patentee gets is the limited
period of exclusivity conferred by the patent grant.”).
76. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (arguing
that patents benefit society economically because they reward inventors for both inventing
and disclosing information to the public); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110
MICH. L. REV. 709, 745 (2012) (“The benefit the public gets from the bargain, on [disclosure]
theory, is not (or not just) a new invention but the publication of new learning that might
otherwise have been kept secret.”); Seymore, supra note 73, at 713 (stating that the benefit
to the public of the patent system is “detailed knowledge about the invention as soon as the
patent document publishes”).
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patent system “is not (or not just)” that the public gains new
inventions.77
This differs from another prominent theory—invention theory.78
Invention theorists claim that incentivizing new inventions is the
primary purpose of having a patent system. Invention theorists take
issue with disclosure theorists’ focus on the benefits of patent
disclosure (which is overly narrow, invention theorists would
argue).79
Still another school of thought—often called prospect the-
ory—holds that the real public benefit of the patent system is not
the inventions it incentivizes or the information it discloses. Rather,
according to prospect theorists, the primary public benefit of the
patent system is in establishing clearly delineated research rights
among firms.80 Strong and broad property rights in inventions are
necessary to encourage exploitation and commercialization of the
inventive idea, and they are the primary benefit that the public
receives in the patent quid pro quo.81
However, for all of the disagreements between the various the-
ories, they are all in accord about what the benefits of the patent
system are for the patentee.82 Theorists of all stripes point to the
patent’s right to exclude as the reason that an inventor chooses to
enter the patent system.83
77. Lemley, supra note 76, at 745 (emphasis added).
78. See Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917,
928-29 (explicating that inventors have the “requisite incentives” to invent because the patent
system’s right to exclude eliminates free riders); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004) (“Absent in-
tellectual property protection, most would prefer to copy rather than create ideas.”).
79. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 76, at 745 (“Disclosure theory cannot, however, support
the modern patent system. Simply put, inventors don’t learn their science from patents.”).
80. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 268-69 (1977).
81. See id. In this sense prospect theory is similar to the commercialization theory. For
ease of reference, I will refer to these sets of theories as prospect theory throughout. For more
on the commercialization theory of patents, see Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of
Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1073-78 (2007); Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 347-53 (2010).
82. There are hosts of other utilitarian-based theories of the patent system. See, e.g.,
Lemley, supra note 76, at 753-56 (proposing the “patent race” theory). But all these theories
share the view that the patentee’s benefit from the quid pro quo is exclusive rights.
83. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1009, 1010 (2008) (stating that the “long favored” judicial explanation of the patent
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Some scholars, however, have sought to examine alternative
motivations for patenting.84 These scholars have looked beyond the
patent’s right to exclude for explanations into why people patent.85
For example, some scholars have examined the psychological as-
pects of why inventors choose to patent, concluding that the right to
exclude is not the only way to encourage inventive activity.86 Other
scholars have looked at possible marketing purposes of patents as
potential incentives that encourage the patenting of the invention
in the first place.87 Still others have looked at patents as signals to
investors.88 However, all of these studies’ critiques of the exclusive
rights paradigm in patent law are partial. All extant accounts
assume that the exclusive rights of a patent are at least partially,
if not fully, responsible for the patentee seeking patent protection.89
To be sure, there are a host of theories for why people patent that
are not based on the desire to obtain exclusive rights. Scholars have
theorized that inventors may acquire patents for a variety of
system is an “exchang[e] [of] public disclosure of the claimed invention in return for the grant
of a period of exclusive rights”); Lee, supra note 78, at 928 (“The patent system promotes
innovation by conferring time-limited exclusive rights to new inventions.”); Seymore, supra
note 73, at 728-29.
84. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A
Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 2-3 (2000) (explaining how corporations use patents as
“competitive weapon[s]” and marketing tools); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the
Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 137-48 (2000) (suggesting
multiple “new uses” of patents as “defense ... against litiga[tion]” and “financing tools”).
85. This does not include those scholars who have analyzed whether the patent quid pro
quo is the only justification for the existence of the patent system. Many scholars have
analyzed whether the patent system is more fully explained by natural rights theories than
by economics. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4, 32, 71
(2011) (justifying intellectual property rights through a natural rights lens).
86. See, e.g., Bair, supra note 74, at 348 (“Though psychology research suggests that
desert, personality, and social planning values are significant human concerns which, if
respected, have the potential to promote innovative behavior, there is little evidence to
suggest that a financial reward is the best, or even an effective, way to satisfy these
concerns.”).
87. See J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1593-94
(2016) (highlighting the use of patents as marketing tools); Bartow, supra note 84, at 3
(“[P]atents may be good marketing tools.”); see also Neel U. Sukhatme & Maxwell Gregg
Bloche, Health Care Costs and the Arc of Innovation, 104 MINN. L. REV. 955 (2019).
88. See Lemley, supra note 84, at 137-44; Long, supra note 1, at 646.
89. But see Sukhatme & Bloche, supra note 87, at 975-76. Although this piece is about the
use of patents beyond the right to exclude, it is silent about the motivations to patent in the
first place.
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nonpecuniary reasons. For instance, they may be in search of the
prestige that a patent gives.90 Alternatively, they may be attempt-
ing to signal to some third party that they or their company is
innovative.91 However, none of these previous studies have contem-
plated that one might seek a nonexcludable patent.
This Part will detail a conundrum for extant patent theories. Why
would an inventor seek a patent if the law does not permit them to
enforce that patent? Utilitarian patent theory predicts that without
the exclusive rights granted by a patent, inventors will opt for trade
secrecy or simply will not invent in the first place.92 Yet some
inventors do patent despite not being able to enforce the patent.
Section A will set up the problem, discussing a provision in the U.S.
Code that creates immunity from direct patent infringement of
surgical method patents. Section B will then demonstrate that
despite this provision, surgical method patents continue to be ac-
quired. The following Sections of this Article are devoted to the
question of why these patents are obtained.
A. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)
1. Enactment
Twenty years ago, Congress amended the Patent Act to shield
doctors and hospitals, among others, from infringement liability for
practicing a patented medical procedure.93 Congress adopted the
statute in response to physicians and medical associations that had
become concerned about the impact that patents might have on
medical practitioners.94 This concern came to a head on July 6,
90. See Toby E. Stuart, Technological Prestige and the Accumulation of Alliance Capital,
in CORPORATE SOCIAL CAPITAL AND LIABILITY 376, 382-83, 388 (Roger Th.A.J. Leenders &
Shaul M. Gabbay eds., 1999) (demonstrating the prestige factor in patent grants).
91. See Long, supra note 1, at 637, 651-52.
92. See, e.g., id. at 627 (challenging “the traditional assumption that exclusivity is the al-
pha and the omega of the private value of patent rights”).
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012). For more on the physician immunity statute, see
generally Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at
35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601 (2000).
94. See Eric M. Lee, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)—The Physician Immunity Statute, 79 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 701, 702-04 (1997) (tracing the medical communities’ lobbying efforts
around 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)). For more on lobbying done by judges, see J. Jonas Anderson,
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1993, when a surgeon filed a patent infringement lawsuit against
another surgeon.95 In that suit, Dr. Samuel Pallin had acquired a
patent on a new method of performing cataract surgery.96 Dr. Pallin
sued Dr. Jack Singer for infringement, alleging that Dr. Singer had
performed the patented procedure on patients without Dr. Pallin’s
permission.97 The United States District Court for the District of
Vermont eventually entered a consent judgment declaring the
patent claims invalid.98 Nevertheless, the prospect of liability for
performing a medical procedure was a frightening reality for med-
ical practitioners. So much so that while the Pallin case was still in
litigation, the American Medical Association (AMA) adopted a res-
olution condemning the patenting of medical procedures.99
Under intense pressure from the AMA and other physician
groups, Congress carved out immunity from patent litigation for
medical practitioners and any related health care entity (such as the
hospital where the infringing activity occurs).100 That immunity
statute was codified as 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). That section states: “With
respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity
that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b), the
provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not apply against
the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with
respect to such medical activity.”101
Congress was also conscious that other interest groups (primarily
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries) would object to
Judicial Lobbying, 91 WASH. L. REV. 401, 432-35 (2016) (documenting the extensive lobbying
done by the chief judge of the Federal Circuit during the period of legislative action preceding
the America Invents Act).
95. Pallin v. Singer, No. 5:93-22, 1995 WL 608365, at *1 (D. Vt. May 1, 1995).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Pallin v. Singer, No. 2:93-CV-202, 1996 WL 274407, at *1 (D. Vt. Mar. 28, 1996).
99. See John Glasson, Reports of Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs: Patenting of
Medical Procedures, 144 AMA PROC. H. DEL. 200 (1995).
100. For more on the legislative battle over 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012), see Lee, supra note
78, at 704-08 (chronicling the “stealth legislation” that led to the physician immunity statute).
101. Id. Section 287 is not the only exception to the general rules of infringement that
exists in Title 35 of the U.S. Code. For example, the temporary presence exception to
infringement (35 U.S.C. § 272) exempts from infringement the use of a patent in any vehicle
that temporarily enters into the United States. See J. Jonas Anderson, Hiding Behind
Nationality: The Temporary Presence Exception and Patent Infringement Avoidance, 15 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 12-17 (2008).
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the breadth of § 287(c).102 To assuage these industries’ concerns
about their patents being unenforceable against direct infrigers,
Congress defined a “medical activity” as excluding (1) the use of a
patented composition of matter during the procedure and (2) the use
of a “biotechnology patent.”103
Section 287 is a strange compromise. It shields surgeons, doctors,
nurses, hospitals, and health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
from patent infringement liability.104 Nevertheless, § 287(c) does not
invalidate surgical method patents nor restrict the ability to obtain
such patents. Indeed, the original bill would have made medical
procedures unpatentable, unless the patent also claimed a machine
or “composition of matter.”105 The biotech industry vehemently
opposed that version of the bill, ultimately killing it.106
Although § 287(c) forecloses patentees from suing the most like-
ly infringers (doctors, hospitals, HMOs), the possibility of suing a
party for contributory infringement remains.107 A recent case out
of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
dealt with such a scenario.108 Johns Hopkins University (JHU)
obtained a patent on surgical techniques and related equipment for
eye surgery.109 According to JHU’s patent, openings are made in the
eye, which are then filled with “cannulas,” which are essentially
tubes through which surgical instruments pass.110 After the surgery
is completed, the cannulas are removed and the openings heal
102. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
103. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A). Unfortunately, Congress did not define “biotechnology
patent,” a definition that has not been supplied by the courts at the time this Article was
written.
104. Id. § 287(c).
105. Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act, H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995).
106. See Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act and Inventor Protection Act
of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 92-106 (1995) (statement of Dr. Frank
Baldino, Jr., President and CEO of Cephalon, Inc.).
107. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 195-96 (6th ed. 2013) (stating that the value of medical procedure
patents likely lies in the ability to sue manufacturers of medical devices required in the
surgery).
108. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 15-525-SLR-SRF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
70403, at *3 (D. Del. Apr. 5, 2018).
109. Id. at *2-3.
110. Id. at *2.
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naturally.111 JHU sued Alcon—a manufacturer of surgical instru-
ments—for contributory patent infringement.112 On a motion for
summary judgement, the court found that Alcon could be liable for
contributory infringement of the patent, even though § 287(c)
protected the direct infringers (in this case, doctors).113 Because
§ 287(c) did not protect Alcon as a manufacturer, Alcon could be
found to be contributorily liable.114
In sum, the medical procedure space is available for patenting,
but those patents are not enforceable against direct infringers. Of
course, through contributory liability, patentees can (and do) target
device manufacturers for infringement.115 However, contributory
liability is only available when the device manufacturer “know[s]”
that its product is “especially made or especially adapted” for
infringement of the patent and the device is not “suitable for ...
noninfringing use.”116 In other words, to be liable for contributory
infringement, a manufacturer’s device must (1) be used to commit
acts of direct patent infringement, (2) constitute “a material part of
the invention,” and (3) not be a “staple article or commodity of com-
merce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”117 In addition, the
manufacturer must (4) know that the product is “especially made or
especially adapted for use” in infringing the patent.118 None of these
things is necessary to demonstrate direct infringement.119
Thus, § 287 grants immunity to defendants accused of directly
infringing a patent covering a medical procedure. It does not limit
the contributory liability to patent infringement.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *75-76.
114. Id. at *40-41.
115. Id.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012); see Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (stating the standard for contributory liability).
117. Arris Grp., Inc. v. British Telecomms. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)) (listing the factors that a party asserting contributory infringe-
ment must prove).
118. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U.S. 754, 764, 768 (2011) (quoting 35
U.S.C. § 271(b)) (holding that the standard for scienter in contributory liability cases is “will-
ful blindness” (emphasis omitted)).
119. Dmitry Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. REV.
565, 568-69 (2017) (explaining that patent infringement is much more difficult to prove
against manufacturers (contributory liability) than against end users (direct liability)).
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2. Litigation Surrounding § 287(c)
A review of the sparse litigation that has arisen in the twenty
years since § 287(c) became law reveals just how limited a surgical
method patent’s rights to exclude are. The cases also demonstrate
the broad reach that courts have given to § 287(c)’s immunity.
The first time that a court ruled on the application of § 287(c)
was in 2008, over a decade after Congress passed the statute.120
In that case, Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., Emtel accused various
physician groups of infringing its patent on videoconferencing
between medical care facilities.121 In response, the defendants
claimed immunity under § 287(c).122
As a first step in the court’s analysis of the case, the court
interpreted § 287(c)’s requirement that the allegedly infringing acts
must involve “the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on
a body.”123 It interpreted the “medical procedure” requirement
broadly.124 The court ruled that doctors who were videoconferencing
about a patient’s care were performing a “medical procedure[ ],” as
§ 287(c) defines it.125 According to the court, “[d]iagnosing a medical
condition, providing instructions to a different medical caregiver,”
and “aiding” in treatment were all activities covered by § 287(c).126
Furthermore, the court held that “related health care entity” cov-
ered a wide variety of entities.127 Because the doctors in this case
had agreements that dealt with medical care, they were all “related
health care entities,” even though they did not work in the same
facility or necessarily meet the patient who was to receive the
medical care.128
Ultimately, the court denied the defendants’ claim that § 287(c)
granted them immunity.129 The patent claims in the case required
the use of videoconferencing to diagnose a patient’s medical
120. Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
121. Id. at 814.
122. Id. at 818.
123. Id. at 819-24.
124. Id. at 823-24.
125. Id. at 824.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 824-25.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 826.
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condition.130 While the court found that the doctors were performing
a “medical procedure” as defined by § 287(c), that medical procedure
did not constitute infringement of the claim.131 Further steps (i.e.,
setting up videoconferencing between hospitals) were needed to
infringe the patent.132 Therefore, § 287(c) did not cover the activities
in the case.133 In essence, the court found that the patent covered
more than the medical activity in which the doctors were engaged
in this case; therefore, the doctors could not claim § 287(c)’s pro-
tection.
Emtel demonstrates the broad scope of the immunity provision of
§ 287(c) while also highlighting the limited usefulness of the im-
munity for most defendants. The court interpreted “medical
activities” as encompassing more than the surgical techniques that
caused Congress to enact the statute.134 Similarly, the court said
that a broad cast of characters fit under § 287(c)’s ambit: not only
were the doctors performing surgery and the hospitals in which the
patients were treated covered, but also anyone affiliated with the
doctor (including nurses and other doctors who were consulted) or
hospitals that were contracted to perform any part of the medical
procedure.135 Ultimately, the court made it clear that although
§ 287(c)’s immunity can protect any affiliated entity, the scope of
the patent limits § 287(c)’s role. The more steps that the patent
has that do not constitute medical activity, the less likely that
infringers will be immune from infringement liability.
Further cases have clarified that § 287(c) is available to the U.S.
government,136 as well as sketched out the contours of contributory
infringement liability under § 287(c).137 In total, there have been
130. Id. at 825-26.
131. Id. This holding (that the “medical activity” is not the infringing act) is highly de-
pendent on claim construction, the doctrine that permits judges to interpret the meaning of
claims. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical,
and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2014); J. Jonas
Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in Patent Claim Con-
struction, 109 NW. U. L REV. 187 (2015). The uncertainty surrounding claim construction
makes analogizing this case to future cases difficult.
132. Emtel, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d at 825-26.
133. Id. at 826.
134. See Pallin v. Singer, No. 5-22, 1995 WL 608365, at *1 (D. Vt. May 1, 1995).
135. Emtel, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d at 824-25.
136. See, e.g., Lamson v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 755, 762 (2014).
137. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 15-525-SLR-SRF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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only four written cases addressing § 287(c) since the provision was
passed by Congress over two decades ago.138 In those cases, courts
have defined “medical activity” very broadly.139 They have also
broadly defined who is a “medical practitioner” and therefore eli-
gible for § 287(c) protection.140 Courts have construed § 287(c) to
cover a broad range of medical activities, including teleconferenc-
ing between hospitals.141
70403, at *76 (D. Del. Apr. 5, 2018). See supra Part I.A.1 for more about contributory liability.
138. A recent case out of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas confirms
the limited applicability of § 287 protection. In Viveve, Inc. v. Thermigen, LLC, a doctor was
accused of infringing a patented method for vaginal reconstruction. No. 2:16-CV-1189-JRG,
2017 WL 1425604, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2017). The accused infringer, Dr. Alinsod,
appeared on the daytime television show The Doctors to demonstrate the procedure, and to
promote his own device used in the procedure. Id. at *3. I have written extensively elsewhere
about the Eastern District of Texas’s proclivity to expand the rights of patent holders. See J.
Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543, 1585-86 (2018) (arguing that the court
exhibits signs of “capture”); J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 631, 651-54 (2015) (documenting the ways that the Eastern District of Texas has tried
to attract patent plaintiffs to file in the district); J. Jonas Anderson, Judge Shopping in the
Eastern District of Texas, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 539, 555 (2016) (criticizing the Eastern District
of Texas for “ero[ding] ... the public perception of the patent system”); J. Jonas Anderson,
Reining in a “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the Eastern District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1569, 1576 (2018) (noting the various procedural advantages that the Eastern District
of Texas offers patent plaintiffs).
The court in Viveve examined § 287(c)(3) and found that section precluded Dr. Alinsod’s
defense of immunity. 2017 WL 1425604, at *5. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(3) states:
This subsection does not apply to the activities of any person ... who is engaged
in the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution
of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter ... where such activities are:
(A) directly related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale, impor-
tation, or distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter ...
and
(B) regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Public
Health Service Act, or the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(3) (2012). Section 287(c)(3) excludes from immunity (1) medical activities
that are directly related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or
distribution of a medical device and (2) medical activities that are regulated under certain
federal statutes. Id. The court in Viveve found that Dr. Alinsod’s appearance on The Doctors
was purely for product promotion and therefore satisfied “the first element of the exception
contained in c(3).” Viveve, 2017 WL 1425604, at *4. Therefore, Dr. Alinsod could not claim
§ 287(c) immunity.
139. See, e.g., Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
140. See, e.g., id. at 819.
141. See, e.g., id. at 826.
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However, courts have been strict about which patents are covered
under § 287(c).142 Courts have rejected some § 287(c) defenses be-
cause the patent claims covered more than the protected medical
activities.143 In addition, a district court recently determined that
“medical activity” may not be covered by § 287 if the purpose of the
surgery is to promote sales of a surgical device.144
Thus, the few cases involving § 287(c) reinforce Congress’s desire
to create a safe haven from infringement liability for medical
practitioners and medical institutions, while simultaneously re-
stricting which patents fall under the provision. 
B. The Existence of Nonexcludable Patents
To get a better sense of the number of patents that are non-
excludable due to § 287(c), one need look no further than the
USPTO. The USPTO’s database of issued patents in classes 600,
604, and 606 is a helpful starting point. These are all “surgery”
patent subclasses, and they do not necessarily (although many do)
require a “device,” unlike many of the other surgery classes.145
Therefore, patents within these classes do not automatically lend
themselves to a contributory infringement claim.146
But I am interested in those patents that do not have the ability
to exclude anyone, whether the infringers are infringing directly or
indirectly. Thus, I looked for nonexcludable patents in three steps.
First, I discarded any patent that is directed to a device or composi-
tion of matter. This is because patents on devices or compositions of
matter are expressly enforceable against direct infringers under
142. See, e.g., id.
143. See, e.g., id.
144. Viveve, Inc. v. Thermigen, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-1189-JRG, 2017 WL 1425604, at *5 (E.D.
Tex. Apr. 20, 2017).
145. For instance, class 602 is entitled “Surgery: Splint, Brace, or Bandage.” Patents Counts
by Year—January 1977-December 2015, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm#PartA [https://perma.cc/9N56-C3XS] [hereinafter
Patent Counts by Year]. While it is possible to have a completely unenforceable patent in this
class because of § 287(c) (imagine a new technique of using a known bandage), I think most
of these patents are directed to a new splint, brace, or bandage. Therefore, such patents would
be enforceable against the manufacturers of the splint, brace, or bandage.
146. See supra Part I.A for more on contributory infringement.
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§ 287(c).147 Second, I discarded any “biotechnology” patent. This is
because “biotechnology” patents are similarly expressly outside of
§ 287(c)’s coverage.148 In essence, patents that require a drug are
not properly characterized as nonexcludable patents.149 Third, and
the most difficult task in my search for nonexcludable patents, I de-
termined whether the patent required an “especially made” de-
vice.150 To evaluate this, I often had to research the particular device
to determine whether the device was produced especially for the
surgical method described in the patent or whether the device was
used for other, “noninfringing use[s].”151 If such a device is required
by the patent claim, the patent is not properly characterized as
nonexcludable, because a contributory infringer might be excluded.
To summarize, in the search for nonexcludable patents, one must
ignore patents that claim a device, patents that require or cover a
composition of matter, and patents that require a device that is
“especially made” for the infringing act.152 Any surgical method
patent that meets all of those three criteria (no device, not a
composition of matter, does not have “especially made” device) is a
nonexcludable patent. That is, inventors know (or at least should
know) that the patent is nonexcludable before filing.
For example, patent number 8,974,442, covering a method of
facial rejuvenation, is a nonexcludable patent.153 The ‘442 Patent
147. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A) (2012) (defining “medical activities” to not include patented
machines or compositions of matter).
148. Id.; see supra Part I.A.
149. Courts have not defined what a “biotechnology” patent is and neither did Congress
when they passed 35 U.S.C. § 273(c). But the statutory history of § 273(c) indicates that
Congress was mainly concerned with patents that encompassed a pharmaceutical coming
under § 273(c)’s immunity.
150. This is to avoid the contributory infringement problem. Section 287(c) does not shield
makers of surgical devices from infringement liability. Thus, if the method requires a device
that is “especially made or especially adapted” for the infringing use, id. § 271(c), the patentee
could potentially sue the manufacturer of the device for contributory liability. Note, that
under § 287(c), a medical practitioner is still a direct infringer, thus allowing contributory
liability. Section 287(c) merely limits the remedies that can be sought against a medical
practitioner that infringes a surgical method patent.
151. Id.
152. This last exclusion is to rule out those patents that might be acquired in the hopes of
targeting a surgical device manufacturer under a theory of contributory infringement. For an
example of this, see Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 15-525-SLR-SRF, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 70403, at *76 (D. Del. Apr. 5, 2018).
153. See U.S. Patent No. 8,974,442 (filed Mar. 20, 2009).
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was issued to William K. Boss, Jr., of Hackensack, New Jersey on
March 10, 2015.154 The ‘442 Patent claims priority back to a patent
application filed in March of 2009.155 The patent claims a method for
rejuvenating a facial area that comprises the steps of making an
incision in the skin, separating the skin from the underlying tissue,
and then applying heat from a laser under the skin.156 After
applying the heat from the laser, the surgeon applies sutures,
causing a tightening of the treated area.157 Then follows a second
round of tightening with sutures.158 Finally, the surgeon cuts off the
excess skin.159
It is virtually impossible to find infringement liability against
anyone on this patent: § 287(c) protects the surgeon and her medical
staff, the hospital or office where the procedure would take place,
and even the insurance company that would pay for such a proce-
dure.160 Furthermore, no one else could be contributorily liable; the
manufacturer of the sutures used in the technique would not be
liable because the sutures are a staple commodity with substantial
noninfringing uses.161 So too is any producer of lasers which are
incidentally used in the procedure.162
The Boss patent, among others, demonstrates that nonexcludable
patents exist. That revelation goes against bedrock patent doctrine
that posits that inventors only seek patents that can exclude others.








160. See supra Part II.A.
161. See supra Part II.A.
162. Of course, one could imagine a set of highly specific (not to mention odd) facts which
might incur contributory liability. For example if a manufacturer created sutures that were
only suitable for this specific method of facial rejuvenation surgery and knew that the sutures
were used to infringe this patent. Even in that highly unlikely scenario, such a producer of
sutures would escape liability if he could show that the sutures did not comprise a “material
part of the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012).
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II. WHY DO INVENTORS PURSUE NONEXCLUDABLE PATENTS?
Knowing that nonexcludable patents exist raises an obvious
question: Why are these patents obtained? This Part will approach
this question in two ways. The first is by appeal to traditional right-
to-exclude notions. The second examines theories from patent law
and real property that are not based on exclusive rights. Ultimately,
the nonexclusive rights theories have more explanatory power for
the phenomenon of patentees obtaining patents on nonexcludable
surgical method patents.
A. Exclusive Rights Explanations
1. Ignorance of the Law
Some inventors may not be aware that they cannot enforce their
surgical method patent. The circumstances that can lead inventors
to unknowingly obtain a nonexcludable patent vary. One way that
this may occur might be due to the fact that some patentees file
their patent applications pro se.163 Filing a patent as a nonattorney
has a number of potential pitfalls.164 An inventor who files a patent
pro se is much more likely to abandon the patent application un-
knowingly or to end up with narrower claims, and is less likely to
take advantage of examiner interviews than is a patentee repre-
sented by an attorney.165 Representing oneself before the USPTO
has additional risks.166 Pro se patentees of surgical methods may
163. See Kate S. Gaudry, The Lone Inventor: Low Success Rates and Common Errors
Associated with Pro-Se Patent Applications, PLoS ONE, Mar. 2012, at 2 (finding that pro se
patent applicants more frequently abandon their patents than those applicants who are
represented by a patent attorney). For more about pro se patent litigants, see John P.
Flannery & Ira P. Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More than a Pawn in the
Game, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 769, 772 (1975) (including patent cases among the federal cases that
are frequently litigated pro se).
164. Gaudry, supra note 163, at 2.
165. Id. at 3-4, 8.
166. See generally Flannery & Robbins, supra note 163, at 773 (stating that most pro se
litigants “proceed without counsel for the former reason, and most, although their injury is
real, fail—notwithstanding the maxim, ‘ubi injuria, ibi remedia’—because there is no remedy,
at least in federal court, for the injury sustained” (footnote omitted)).
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have little knowledge about the complexities of patent law. These
patentees may not realize that the patents they receive are not
enforceable against any realistic infringer. In fact, they might not
know about the very existence of § 287(c).
Nevertheless, pro se applicants’ ignorance of the physician im-
munity statute cannot explain why inventors obtain patents on
surgical methods. Pro se applications represent an extremely small
subset of all patent applications.167
The mere fact that an attorney prosecutes a patent does not tell
us anything about what the inventor thought her options would be
once she obtained a patent. For instance, one could imagine an
attorney filing and prosecuting a patent without ever informing the
patentee of the limited enforcement options that § 287(c) imposes.
However, it does appear to be malpractice for an attorney to fail to
inform a client seeking a surgical method patent that surgical
method patents are not enforceable against the most likely group of
infringers. This would seem to be well below the professional
standard of care for patent attorneys.168
Ultimately, while it is conceivable that a few surgical method
patentees may not know of § 287(c), it is unlikely that lack of
knowledge is a systemic problem among this class of patentees.
2. Better Safe than Sorry
Another potential explanation for acquisition of nonexcludable
surgical method patents is that patentees patent with full knowl-
edge of the nonexcludability of their patents in the hopes that U.S.
law will change in the future. After all, § 287(c) is a recent phenome-
non.169 Just as the law changed to protect physicians from infringe-
ment lawsuits, it can always change back.
167. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
50 (2017), http://uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY17PAR.pdf [https://perma.
cc/46DM-J6SZ] (reporting that from October 2014 to 2017 the Pro Se Art Unit of the USPTO
issued only 525 patents from inventors representing themselves before the USPTO).
168. See Oddi, supra note 15, at 19 (stating that the malpractice standard for patent
attorneys is that they “should exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by patent
attorneys under similar circumstances”).
169. The law was passed in 1996. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 616, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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Congress has not indicated, however, that removing the physician
immunity statute is a priority. While Congress is very active in
other areas of patent law (particularly patent-eligible subject
matter), it does not appear to have expressed any interest in
modifying the surgical method patent regime.170 Therefore, this
explanation seems unlikely.
3. Targeting Contributory Infringers
A much more likely solution to the mystery of why inventors
obtain nonexcludable patents is that the patents are, in fact,
excludable. Section 287(c) covers most would-be infringers from
patent infringement liability but still leaves open the possibility of
suing medical device manufacturers.171 Patentees rarely accuse
device manufacturers of directly infringing a patent. It would be
difficult to do so. Direct patent infringement of a method requires
that the defendant practice each step of the method.172 For surgical
method patents, these usually involve the actual steps involved in
surgery.
Medical device manufacturers are more often involved in suits
alleging contributory infringement. Although § 287(c) forecloses
patentees from suing the most likely infringers (doctors, hospitals,
and HMOs), there remains the possibility of suing a noncovered
party—such as a medical device manufacturer—for contributory
infringement.173 For example, the case of Johns Hopkins University
v. Alcon Laboratories is illustrative of how surgical method patents
170. See, e.g., Press Release, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers
Release Draft Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act (May 22, 2019), https://www.
tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-
draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act [https://perma.cc/B769-N4J7] (proposing
changes to 35 U.S.C. § 101). For an in-depth look at how Congress gets signals about issues
in patent law that need reform from the courts (and vice-versa), see J. Jonas Anderson, Con-
gress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 961 (2014)
(positing that congressional action on a patent topic pushes the Federal Circuit to modify its
precedents); J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (2014) (theorizing
about the dialogic interplay between Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Federal Circuit).
171. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2012).
172. See Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that the
patentee must prove that every step of the patented method was performed by the defendant
in order to hold the defendant liable for infringing a method claim).
173. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 107, at 195.
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can be used to stop an indirect infringer.174 JHU obtained a patent
on surgical techniques and related equipment for eye surgery. Then,
when JHU felt that its patent was being infringed, it sued the
manufacturer of the “tubes” used during such a surgery.175 Had JHU
sued the surgeons performing the surgery, JHU would not have
been able to proceed with such a suit due to § 287(c).176 Thus,
patents on surgical methods can be very excludable, as long as there
is a manufacturer that contributorily infringes the patent.
This monetization strategy (targeting the device manufacturers
for contributory infringement) is probably responsible for much of
the patenting that takes place in the surgical method space. After
all, if a new surgical method involves a device that is specially
adapted for use in the method, a court is very likely to find that de-
vice “especially made” for infringing the patent, a necessity for a
finding of contributory infringement.177 For inventors of surgical
methods that require a specialized tool, therefore, targeting the
tool’s manufacturer is a realistic and perhaps profitable way to
monetize the patent.
Yet this cannot explain all of the patenting of surgical methods.
Indeed, by my method for finding nonexcludable patents,178 the third
step is to reject any patent that has a likely contributory in-
fringer.179 Although secondary liability is a major (if not the major)
incentive for patentees to seek surgical method patent protection,
there are some patents for which finding contributory liability is
virtually impossible. For the patentees of these patents, there must
be some nonexclusive rights explanation for their activity.
174. For more on this case, see supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
176. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
177. Contributory infringement requires (1) that the product be used in direct infringe-
ment, (2) that the product constitutes a “material part of the invention,” (3) the supplier knew
that the product was “especially adapted” for an infringing use, and (4) the product is not a
“staple article.” Arris Grp., Inc. v. British Telecomms. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)).
178. See supra Part I.B. for an explanation of my method of identifying nonexcludable
patents.
179. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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B. Nonexclusive Rights Explanations
1. Signaling
We can say with some certainty that the inventors of non-
excludable surgical method patents were not motivated to patent
by the rights to exclude. This is because there are no rights to
exclude in these patents.180 Some surgical method patentees may
want rights to exclude but not be aware of § 287(c), while some
others may be hedging against the possibility that the law will
change to allow them to sue surgeons for infringing their patents.
However, for most surgical method patents, these motivations
add little, if any, explanatory power.
The literature on patent signaling offers a better theory for why
inventors seek nonenforceable patents. Clarisa Long was the first
academic to bring the financial and corporate literature to bear on
the question of what private value a patent imparts on its own-
er.181 In so doing, she moved away from all previous patent scholar-
ship, with its singular focus on the exclusive rights of a patent.182
Key to Long’s theory was the insight that a patent’s private value is
not measured only by the rents that can be acquired from the rights
to exclude, but also by the value that a patent has in conveying
hard-to-measure attributes about its owner.183 Thus signaling the-
ory represents an acknowledgment of a patent’s usefulness as a
means of overcoming informational asymmetries between patentees
and observers.184
This signaling can be valuable in securing investment from
outside firms.185 Outside firms may have trouble reliably distin-
guishing innovative companies from noninnovative ones.186 To the
extent that patents serve as a rough proxy for innovativeness, they
180. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
181. See Long, supra note 1, at 627 (“In the following Article, I will build on the finance and
corporate law literature to provide a new general framework for analyzing the function and
effect of intellectual property rights.”).
182. See id. (stating that Patent Signaling signaled a move beyond a singular focus on
“rights and rents”).
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can be worthwhile to acquire for the ability to attract investors who
are seeking innovative investment opportunities.
For surgeons, this signaling can take various forms. Surgeons
are often “user-innovator[s]”—consumers of products or techniques
who subsequently reinvent or redesign the techniques used in sur-
gery.187 Because surgeons often have better knowledge of what a
surgeon needs during surgery than the product manufacturers,
surgeons are optimally situated to improve existing techniques,
products, or processes.188 For surgeons who develop patentable sur-
gical method improvements, patents may serve as a vehicle for
promoting the knowledge of the new technique and the identity of
that technique’s inventor to the world.189 Furthermore, the patent
can signal the surgeon’s status as an innovator to companies in-
terested in collaborating with an innovative surgeon.190
Other aspects of signaling theory may serve as motivations to
patent surgical method innovations. Surgeons, like other profession-
als, value recognition from their peers for achievements.191 A patent
can signal to other surgeons that the holder of a patent on a surgical
technique is the leader in the technique’s field.192 Further, recogni-
tion as the method’s creator is another benefit of obtaining a patent,
especially once the technique or method is adopted widely. Often,
surgeons that develop a new way of performing surgery demonstrate
the surgery for other surgeons in the field.193 A patent may serve as
a marker to others that the presenter of a new technique has the
bona fides to which he claims.194
A surgeon may be interested in a patent for the prestige it con-
fers, another form of signaling.195 Having a number of patents on
187. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 22, at 3.
188. See Lettl et al., supra note 25, at 259 (finding that surgeons possessed “sticky”
knowledge that product manufacturers cannot acquire on their own without substantial
investment).
189. See id. at 265.
190. Id. at 251.
191. See, e.g., Ali Azizzadeh et al., Factors Influencing Career Choice Among Medical
Students Interested in Surgery, 60 CURRENT SURGERY 210, 212 (2003) (stating that recognition
from peers is a motivating factor when medical students decide to pursue surgery).
192. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Azizzadeh et al., supra note 191, at 212.
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one’s wall (next to a number of fancy diplomas) can create a sense
of prestige.196 Having a number of patents can also lead to prestige
among consumers: as the patentee of a surgical method, consumers
may view a surgeon-patentee as a prestigious alternative to other
surgeons performing the very same surgical technique.197 The new
prevalence of medical advertising can also be a prestige driver; the
most prestigious doctor can likely charge a premium for his ser-
vices.198
There are also signaling functions of patents that are not directed
towards the surgeon’s peers or the surgeon’s customers. Acquiring
patents may be beneficial to the surgeon’s employer. Many sur-
geons also have appointments at medical schools.199 With the con-
stant pressure to publish in order to gain tenure, some schools
consider patents along with peer-reviewed publications when mak-
ing tenure decisions.200 Similarly, patents serve as evidence of hav-
ing met funding requirements for some medical faculty.201 Texas
196. I will admit to having a lawyer’s version of the doctor’s “prestige wall” in my office. I
am not proud of it.
197. Many surgeons are motivated to give pride of place to their patents. Brian Weiner, a
doctor at University of Florida Medical School, mentions his patents on his UF Medicine page,
but also has an article about his patents. See Mickie Anderson, Survey Says ..., GAINESVILLE
SUN (July 23, 2016), https://www.gainesville.com/news/20160723/survey-says- [https://perma.
cc/YAR8-UXYP]; see also Boaz Avitall, MD/PhD, UI HEALTH, https://hospital.uillinois.edu/
find-a-doctor/boaz-avitall [https://perma.cc/WMW4-8X6N]; John Conn, MD, CENTURA HEALTH,
https://www.centura.org/provider-search/john-conn-md [https://perma.cc/A6QB-SJLT];
Nicholas Theodore, M.D., M.S., JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/
profiles/results/directory/profile/10003384/nicholas-theodore [https://perma.cc/L7XK-36DQ].
198. For more on the ethical issues with marketing and the medical field, see Eugene M.
Bricker, Industrial Marketing and Medical Ethics, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1690, 1690-92
(1989).
199. See Paul J. Schenarts, Surgeons as Educators Faculty, AM. C. SURGEONS, https://www.
facs.org/education/division-of-education/courses/surgeons-as-educators/faculty [https://perma.
cc/5AT2-JJRB].
200. See, e.g., Kevin A. Morano, Promotion and Tenure, U. TEX. MCGOVERN MED. SCH.,
https://med.uth.edu/faculty-affairs/files/2015/10/PT-Talk-faculty-2017-final.pdf [https://perma.
cc/VF8S-7V4L] (“Evidence of scholarly activity can be in many forms, e.g., peer-publications,
invited articles, awards and honors, participation on grants, patents issued/licensed, etc.”).
201. See, e.g., GEISEL SCH. OF MED. AT DARTMOUTH, ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS, PROMO-
TIONS AND TITLES 46-47 (2017), https://geiselmed.dartmouth.edu/faculty/pdf/geisel_faculty_
apt.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBF6-C7FZ]; STRITCH SCH. OF MED., FACULTY APPOINTMENT,
PROMOTION AND TENURE GUIDELINES 5 (2017), https://ssom.luc.edu/media/stritchschoolof
medicine/cart/pdfs/current_promotion_and_tenure_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/84KL-
N9E7] (such evidence can include that the researcher was “[g]ranted substantive patents
based on his or her research as evidenced by likelihood to lead to licensing agreements and
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A&M created quite a stir in May 2006 when it added commercial-
ization considerations as a factor to be taken into account when
faculty are evaluated for tenure.202 Somewhat surprisingly, other
major institutions have not followed Texas A&M, at least pub-
licly.203 However, there is some indication that other institutions
have followed Texas A&M privately.204
Some surgeons place a high value on the signaling function of
patents. At times, the signals that a patent communicates are
proxies for harder to verify information.205 For example, a patent
may signal to an employer that the surgeon who developed a new
technique is an active researcher.206 Alternatively, a patent may
signal to potential customers that a particular surgeon-patentee is
the best in his field.207 More to the point, a surgical method patent
may signal to device manufacturers that the surgeon-patentee is
innovative in his field.208 That sort of signal often leads to monetary
rewards that are not dependent on the excludability of the patent.
2. Personhood
Aside from signaling theory, personhood theory also explains the
appeal of nonexcludable patents. Freidrich Hegel’s “personhood
theory” relies on the premise that property provides the mechanism
royalties to the University”). At the Northwestern Feinberg School of Medicine, patents and
licenses are included under research/publications portfolios. NORTHWESTERN UNIV. FEINBERG
SCH. OF MED. INFORMATION GUIDE FOR APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTION AND TENURE (APT) 20-21
(2019), https://www.feinberg.northwestern.edu/fao/docs/admin-general/Information-Guide-for-
APT.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6EC-C6FZ].
202. Sara Lipka, Texas A&M: Patents to Count for Tenure, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June
9, 2006), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Texas-A-M-Patents-to-Count/20735 [https://perma.
cc/66E4-BWMH].
203. See Ashley J. Stevens et al., The Role of Patents and Commercialization in the Tenure
and Promotion Process, 13 TECH. & INNOVATION 241, 243 (2011).
204. See id. at 242-44 (finding that 25 percent of survey respondents include commer-
cialization when making tenure decisions).
205. See Long, supra note 1, at 627.
206. For an example of how patents signal research activity, see Steven Ross Pomeroy,
Business and Patent Activities Should Count Towards Academic Tenure, FORBES (May 5,
2014, 12:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rosspomeroy/2014/05/05/business-and-patent-
activities-should-count-towards-academic-tenure/ [https://perma.cc/2PLU-2M27].
207. See Anderson, supra note 197.
208. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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by which humans achieve self-actualization.209 Hegel proposed that
a person’s core is found in her will, yet the will needs material
objects to express itself.210 Therefore, private property is necessary
to provide external manifestations of the will.211 Thus, Hegel wrote
that there can be no individual freedom without private property.212
Margaret Jane Radin has built on Hegel’s theory to create a much
more elaborate theory about the way that the law of property should
treat personhood interests.213 Radin’s basic argument, on the nor-
mative level, is that legal rules should be designed with sensitivity
to fungible/personal property distinctions.214 In general, the more an
object has personal value to its owner (i.e., it cannot be replaced by
the value of the object), the more the entitlement should be pro-
tected.215 On the contrary, where an object is fungible (i.e., it can be
replaced by the value of the object), its protection by liability rules
would generally suffice.216
Personhood theory has been used in scholarly discussions of
intellectual property law in general and copyright law in par-
ticular.217 Scholars commonly use Radin’s fungible/personal dichot-
omy to argue that some intellectual products created by the owner
are closer to the personal end of the spectrum.218 Thus, various
scholars use the personality theory in support of arguments calling
for the strengthening of authors’ rights.219
Patent law has been a less fruitful space for scholars writing
about personhood interests, but treatments of the topic do exist.220
209. HEGEL, supra note 30, at 52.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.; see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 531, 542 (2005).
213. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 31, at 957 (proposing a personhood theory of property,
wherein some control over resources in a person’s external environment is necessary for
proper self-development and noting how such a theory is often implicit in court opinions and
commentaries, yet ignored in legal thought).
214. Id. at 959-60.
215. Id. at 986.
216. Id. Radin even suggests that sometimes the taking of fungible property without any
compensation at all may be permitted. Id. at 1014-15.
217. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intel-
lectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 81 (1998).
218. Id. at 85-86.
219. Id. at 165 (calling for the strengthening of the attribution right).
220. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 26, at 276-81; see also Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their
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Yet, in those limited instances where patent law is assessed through
a personhood lens, the focus remains on the right to exclude as the
means by which personality is protected by the law.221 Yet, person-
hood theory can provide insights into why inventors obtain non-
excludable patents.
If an inventor views herself as an inventor, a patent (even a non-
excludable one) is a means of “develop[ing] and realiz[ing] one’s
personality.”222 In the surgical method field, many inventors are, in
fact, surgeons.223 Patent classes 600 and 606 (surgery) are two of the
highest for total number of small inventors.224 Surgery is the area
that has the most individual inventors, which indicates that user
innovation plays an outsized role in this field.225 Studies have
concluded that physician-patentees make up nearly 20 percent of
patents in the medical device field,226 57 percent of existing drugs’
new uses originate through clinical practice,227 and up to 80 percent
of scientific instrument innovations originate from physician-
users.228
Surgeons tend to have a personality type, often referred to as the
“surgical personality.”229 Surgical residents (as compared to other
Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Person-
hood, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 648-52 (1993) (discussing personhood theory as the basis for
granting employees some property rights over inventions created while employed).
221. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 26, at 281 (“The personality theory thus provides an
additional justification for the exclusive rights granted to an inventor under the patent
system.”).
222. Id. at 274.
223. See generally Mareike E. Hinsch et al., User Innovation in Techniques: A Case Study
Analysis in the Field of Medical Devices, 23 CREATIVITY & INNOVATION MGMT. 484 (2014).
224. That is, those patents that are owned, upon grant, by individuals. See Patent Counts
by Year, supra note 145.
225. The other subclasses that exhibit a lot of individual patenting cover “low-level”
technology: static structures, games using tangible projectiles, etc. See id.
226. Aaron K. Chatterji, et al., Physician-Industry Cooperation in the Medical Device
Industry, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1532, 1538 (2008).
227. Thomas Sullivan, The Significant Physician Contribution to the Development of Med-
ical Devices, POL’Y & MED. (May 6, 2018), https://www.policymed.com/2013/10/the-significant-
physician-contribution-to-the-development-of-medical-devices.html [https://perma.cc/ A4CA-
NEVA].
228. VON HIPPEL, supra note 22, at 22.
229. Joseph M. Drosdeck et al., Surgeon and Nonsurgeon Personalities at Different Career
Points, 196 J. SURGICAL RES. 60, 64 (2015) (“Comparisons between surgeons and nonsurgeon
physicians have led credence to the popular belief that there exists a set of personality traits
common to surgeons—the ‘surgical personality.’”).
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residents and medical students) typically score higher on tests of
“conscientiousness.”230 Conscientiousness refers to the tendency to
control impulses in pursuit of goals.231 Additionally, surgeons are
more likely to score higher on “decisiveness, forcefulness, and au-
thoritativeness” than other types of medical doctors.232 These traits
of conscientiousness and decisiveness are beneficial to surgeons
that have to make life-altering decisions very quickly.
Additionally, surgeons are prime candidates to be user innova-
tors.233 Eric von Hippel has shown that users of products are often
better positioned to create innovations that improve upon existing
products.234 Furthermore, studies have shown that surgeons are a
fruitful source of surgical technique innovations.235
Surgeons possess numerous attributes that make them good
sources of innovations. First, the aforementioned personality traits
of surgeons also make for great attributes for innovators.236
Surgeons have to be goal oriented to succeed during their un-
dergraduate, medical, and fellowship studies. As with surgeons, in-
ventors also display high levels of conscientiousness.237 The
230. Benson M. Hoffman et al., Personality Differences Between Surgery Residents, Non-
surgery Residents, and Medical Students, 148 SURGERY 187, 188-90 (2010) (“Conscientious-
ness refers to the tendency to regulate and control impulses in pursuit of our goals.
Individuals who are high in Conscientiousness tend to be organized, efficient, and thorough,
whereas individuals who are low in this trait tend to be more careless and disorderly.”).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 191; see also Nicole J. Borges & Mark L. Savickas, Personality and Medical
Specialty Choice: A Literature Review and Integration, 10 J. CAREER ASSESSMENT 362, 372
(2002); J Herman Gilligan et al., Square Pegs in Round Holes: Has Psychometric Testing a
Place in Choosing a Surgical Career? A Preliminary Report of Work in Progress, 81 ANNALS
ROYAL C. SURGEONS ENG. 73, 78 (1999).
233. Eric von Hippel et al., The Age of the Consumer-Innovator, 53 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV.
27, 28 (2011) (finding that if a consumer is male, highly educated, and technically trained,
“the likelihood that he will innovate in consumer products is ... 210% higher” than it is for the
general population in the United States).
234. See generally VON HIPPEL, supra note 22, at 1 (“[U]sers of products and services-both
firms and individual consumers-are increasingly able to innovate for themselves.”).
235. See Hinsch et al., supra note 223, at 486 (stating that the surgical field exhibits “a lot
of innovation over the last few years” and much of the innovation in the field is “user
innovation in particular”).
236. See Drosdeck et al., supra note 229, at 65.
237. See Allan H. Church & Janine Waclawski, The Relationship Between Individual
Personality Orientation and Executive Leadership Behavior, 71 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGAN.
PSYCHOL. 99, 121 (1998) (finding that inventors are more “driven” in their leadership styles
than other sorts of executives).
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authoritativeness and decisiveness of surgeons are also traits of
inventors, who need both vision and decisiveness to achieve their
goals.238 As one scholar has summarized the literature about
surgeon personality traits, “[S]urgeons are among other things
intellectually curious, highly disciplined, organised[,] and asser-
tive.”239
Furthermore, user innovators tend to have better access to what
von Hippel calls “context-of-use information” regarding surgical
techniques and instruments.240 Although manufacturers of surgi-
cal devices have extensive knowledge about generic solution in-
formation, they lack particularized knowledge about how their
devices are used and, by correlation, how they could be improved.241
Surgeons, on the other hand, have extensive real-world practice
with the various tools. Therefore, surgeons are much better po-
sitioned to know what devices or techniques that have not yet been
developed would be beneficial to other surgeons.242 Put simply,
surgeons have better access to information about surgical needs
than do manufacturers.243
Given the personality characteristics of surgeons and the access
to information about the requirements and deficiencies in existing
surgical techniques, surgeons are likely to be user innovators.
Surgeons generate a great deal of medical device innovation and
surgical technique innovation.244 Surgeons are often responsible for
developing game-changing surgical techniques that greatly reduce
the time of surgery, the time needed for recovery, or some other
aspect of surgery.245
238. See id.
239. Matthew Whitaker, The Surgical Personality: Does It Exist?, 100 ANNALS ROYAL C.
SURGEONS ENG. 72, 77 (2018).
240. VON HIPPEL, supra note 22, at 8 (distinguishing between “context-of-use-information”
and “generic solution information” before stating that both types of knowledge are needed in
product development).
241. Id.
242. See Hinsch et al., supra note 223, at 486-89 (studying four cases of user innovation in
the medical device field).
243. VON HIPPEL, supra note 22, at 8.
244. See Chatterji et al., supra note 226, at 1538 (finding that 20 percent of patents on
medical devices are issued to physicians).
245. See, e.g., Edmund Andrews, Why Doctors Can Be Good at Inventing but Bad for In-
novation, INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/why-
doctors-can-be-good-inventing-bad-innovation [https://perma.cc/NPB8-BKED] (detailing the
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Thus, patents (whether excludable or not) may serve a person-
hood function to surgeons. Surgeons may view part of their persona
as an innovator or an inventor. Acquiring a patent can further this
personhood function by serving as recognition from the U.S. gov-
ernment of the surgeon’s inventiveness. This recognition is not
signaling: no signal is provided to the outside world, necessarily.246
What is important is that the surgeon’s personality as an inventor
is allowed to flourish. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NONEXCLUDABLE PATENTS
A. Theoretical
The fact that some surgeons obtain patents for reasons other than
the right to exclude has vast implications for patent theory. A fa-
miliar narrative runs through patent theory, namely the narrative
of the incentivized inventor.247 Let us take, for example, the
incentive-to-invent theory. The incentive-to-invent theory tells us
that we have a patent system in order to encourage innovation.248
By promising exclusive rights to make and use any invention, the
patent system serves as a “carrot,” encouraging inventors to
invent.249 Under the incentive-to-invent theory, inventor’s desire for
the exclusive rights of the patent are the key part of how innovation
occurs.
Similarly, the prospect theory depends on the incentives created
by a patent’s right to exclude. The prospect theory puts the patent
system’s incentive effect earlier in the innovation timeline than
does the incentive-to-invent theory.250 By creating property rights in
inventive ideas and granting those rights to inventors, prospect
story of Thomas Fogarty, the inventor of the balloon catheter in 1961).
246. Of course, the world is informed of the fact that a patent has been issued to a
particular surgeon.
247. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
247, 251 (1994) (“[T]he R&D that led to the invention might never have occurred in the
absence of the incentive of patentability.”); Kitch, supra note 80, at 266.
248. See Dam, supra note 247, at 247 (“[T]he ‘appropriability problem’—is that, if a firm
could not recover the costs of invention because the resulting information were available to
all, then we could expect a much lower and indeed suboptimal level of innovation.”).
249. See id.
250. See Kitch, supra note 80, at 289.
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theory envisions that a patent demarcates the boundary between
what has been invented and what has not.251 Patents serve much
the same role as land grants in the western United States in the
1800s: identifying an area and placing property rights on that
area.252 Then, the theory goes, anyone who desires to innovate in a
patented space knows who to contact about purchasing that right:
the patent holder.253 Prospect theorists surmise that this also has
the benefit of avoiding costly duplicative research, as someone
wanting to innovate in an area has notice that the patent holder can
exclude them from the patent’s area of research.254 Here too, the
prospect theory depends upon inventors valuing the right to ex-
clude. If that right to exclude is not included in the patent grant,
there would be no reason to prospect areas of inventive activity.
The third main theory of patent law—the disclosure theory—
differs from the prospect and incentive-to-invent theories. In con-
trast to the other two theories of patent law, disclosure theory does
not demand that the patent serve as the carrot to inventors.255
Disclosure theory concerns itself more with encouraging the
disclosure of inventive ideas, ideas that may already have been
created but not revealed to the public.256 Incentive-to-invent and
prospect theories, on the other hand, are concerned with ex ante
inventor behavior based on the prospect of a patent right. For
example, an inventor would be incentivized to invent in a given area
or take on the financial risk of inventing only if he were assured of
the availability of a patent before taking those steps. Disclosure
theory deals with inventors that already have an invention and now
have to decide between keeping that invention as a trade secret and
disclosing that invention to the public.257
251. Id. at 266.
252. Id. at 271.
253. See 1 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES 84-129 (1939); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 87-106 (3d ed. 1950).
254. See Duffy, supra note 13, at 444-45 (“channel[ing] rivalry” in order to get innovations
sooner, is one of the primary aims of prospect theorists).
255. See NARD, supra note 37, at 35.
256. See id. (describing the disclosure theory as “informed in part by the availability of
trade secret protection”).
257. See id.
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The evidence of patents serving a primarily signaling function
challenges all three theories.258 For example, the prospect theory
views a patent’s right to exclude as necessary for the functioning of
the patent system.259 Prospect theory envisions the right to exclude
as fundamental to the narrative of the patent system, serving as a
means of granting rights in technological prospects.260 Without the
right to exclude, there would be no point in granting patents be-
cause the patents would not stop anyone else from treading on the
technological space. Thus, there would be no way to coordinate
inventive activity because one could not exclude others.
Imagining patents as signals, or as serving a personhood inter-
est, undercuts the incentive-to-invent theory. Under this theory,
the inventor is incentivized to undertake the costly process of
innovation by the patent’s right to exclude.261 Without the right to
exclude, the patent would not be attractive to prospective inven-
tors.262 Thus, those inventors would choose to not invent or at least
do so privately.
However, this undermining of traditional incentive-to-invent
theory need not be a wholesale dismissal of that theory. For
surgeons, a patent might provide sufficient nonmonetary incentives
to invent despite the lack of accompanying rights to exclude. The
benefits that a surgeon gains from a patent are likely enough to
incentivize him to invent in the first place. The reputational effects
of the patent plus any personhood benefits (pride, self-worth, etc.)
may spur surgeon-inventors towards the goal of invention.263
Furthermore, one prominent critique of the incentive-to-invent
theory is that the doctrine fails to analyze whether the possibility of
a patent is necessary to encourage the innovation in a particular
instance.264 Granting patents that do not incentivize innovation is
258. See Kitch, supra note 80, at 266 (“That the patent system achieves [its] ends by award-
ing exclusive and publicly recorded ownership” of a patent).
259. See id.
260. For further discussion of patents being used as signals, see Anderson, supra note 87,
at 1592.
261. See Dam, supra note 247, at 247.
262. See id.
263. See supra Part II.B.
264. See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case
for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 191-97 (2009) (leveling this
critique against the incentive-to-invent theory).
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socially costly because the patent restricts others from using the
innovation.265 That cost is generally thought to be acceptable when
a patent is responsible for incentivizing the invention, but is a
burden when the invention would have happened without the pat-
ent.266 Yet in the case of surgical method patents, the cost to society
of granting a patent (even a patent that does not incentivize in-
vention) is much, much smaller because the patents are not en-
forceable against the likely infringers. Therefore, whatever private
value the patent has (i.e., as a signal) more than offsets the mini-
mal social cost.
Disclosure theory, unlike the other two theories of patent law,
does not depend on the existence of the right to exclude. The theory
holds that an inventor is only willing to publicly disclose his
invention if, in exchange, he receives a patent right.267 Theorists
assume the exchanged patent rights are synonymous with exclusive
rights, but they need not be.268 Inventors may obtain patents for a
number of reasons such as marketing, prestige, and pride.269
Disclosure theory does not care why the patentee is willing to make
the exchange, but rather the theory concerns itself with how the
exchange occurs. As long as information about how the invention
works is disclosed to the public, disclosure theorists are satisfied
that granting a patent is beneficial.
Disclosure theorists have thought about the proper scope of the
patent quid pro quo. These theorists have written about the precise
thing that the public is acquiring in the exchange—disclosure—and
have lobbed various critiques at the current disclosure regime and
called for reform.270 Those calls for enablement reform have par-
ticular relevance in the case of patents acquired for signaling value
(less so for patents acquired for personhood interests), as the
following Section will address.
265. Id. at 195-97; see also William Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights:
Patents and Productive Inefficiency, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2045, 2073-77 (2014).
266. Olson, supra note 264, at 189.
267. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
270. See generally Anderson, supra note 87; Sean B. Seymore, Reinvention, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1031 (2017).
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The existence of patents that owe their existence to personhood
or signaling incentives should make us question the assumptions of
traditional patent theories. It might suggest the need for a fourth
patent theory, one in which the patent does not encourage invention
in the first place, but rather is a benefit that is acquired after the
invention is made. The extant theories of patent law all place the
patent as the reason for inventing or at least the reason for dis-
closing. In the incentive-to-invent and prospect theories, the in-
ventor engages in pursuit of his inventive idea because the patent
reward is available. In the disclosure theory, the invention is dis-
closed in exchange for a patent.271
However, the scenario when a patent is granted for an invention
that was created without the incentives of patenting is thought to
be socially costly.272 So, too, is a patent that issues for an invention
that would have been fully disclosed in the absence of patent pro-
tection. Why grant a patent, it is thought, when we already have the
invention and/or the disclosure? This Article suggests that there
are patents that are privately valuable that do not have the typ-
ically assumed social costs: exclusive rights. That scenario has not
been pursued in the literature.
Therefore, while traditional scholarship suggests that we should
not grant patents that do not induce the invention or that do not
induce disclosure, the findings here suggest that there is a place for
such patents. These patents are almost socially costless (i.e., they do
not restrict anyone from using the invention).273 Moreover, these
patents have some social benefits; they increase the storehouse of
knowledge, signal innovative activity, and are a reward for accom-
plishing the invention.
B. Doctrinal
The existence of personhood and signaling patents also has nu-
merous doctrinal implications. This Section will focus on two such
271. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
272. See Olson, supra note 264, at 195-97.
273. Personhood and signaling patents do have costs, of course. Examining patents is not
costless. However, those costs are borne by the private patentee, not by the government. See
supra text accompanying notes 265-66 for more on the potential social costs of signaling
patents.
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implications: one that involves a shift in the USPTO’s review of
patents, and one that involves the fundamental reshaping of the
patent system as a whole. For prudential reasons, I support the
smaller, incremental doctrinal shift while rejecting creating a new
patent-like system. However, perhaps we should rethink why we
have the system at all and whether some other property rights
system should be created for inventors who do not value the rights
to exclude of a patent.
1. Operability Doctrine
Courts view the patent system to be a quid pro quo between the
inventor and the public.274 In exchange for exclusionary rights, the
inventor informs the public about how to make and use the in-
vention.275 As detailed in Part III.A, this view of the patent system
can still work in the absence of exclusive rights. As long as the in-
ventor is getting something that he deems sufficiently valuable in
exchange for knowledge of his invention, the public should be sat-
isfied with the exchange.
Enablement is the doctrine that polices the sufficiency of a pat-
ent’s disclosure. Only patentees who provide sufficient details about
the invention are eligible for a patent.276 Enablement requires that
a patent disclosure enable any person skilled in the art of the pat-
ented technology to practice the patent without “undue experimenta-
tion.”277 Related to enablement is the doctrine that the patent must
be useful.278 Together, the enablement doctrine and the doctrine of
274. See Holbrook, supra note 65, at 125 (“One fundamental premise of patent law, accor-
ding to the courts, is that the system is a quid pro quo between the state and the inventor; in
exchange for disclosing his invention in the patent itself, the inventor is granted the right to
exclude others from practicing the invention for a limited time.”); see also Duffy, supra note
65, at 1361 (stating that the quid pro quo of the patent system has been confused by courts
during the last fifty years).
275. See Holbrook, supra note 65, at 125.
276. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
277. See, e.g., Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *3 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (finding that if “some experimentation is necessary [that] does not
preclude enablement; all that is required is that the amount of experimentation ‘must not be
unduly extensive’” (quoting Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d
1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984))).
278. See 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also Risch, supra note 42, at 57.
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utility ensure that a patentee is giving the public something of val-
ue in the patent bargain.279
Also within the utility doctrine is a requirement that a patent
work as it claims.280 This “operability” doctrine, however, is not a
significant hurdle to patentability.281 Patent applications enjoy a
presumption of operability.282 Indeed, for a patent examiner to reject
a patent on operability grounds, he must affirmatively introduce
evidence that the invention will not work as described.283 This heavy
burden means that in practice, most patents are never challenged
on operability grounds.284
Generally, the assumption that a patent works as described is
not problematic.285 If a patent is granted to an invention that does
not work, the thinking goes, the existence of that erroneously
granted patent does no harm to the public.286 This is because a non-
functioning patent presumably has no value on the market; there-
fore, there is no social cost in granting a patent since there is no
possibility that anyone will be excluded from an inventive area that
does not work. In a similar vein, there is no risk of those bad
patents being involved in costly licensing deals because no one will
pay money for an invention that does not work.
279. See Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1051-52 (2014)
(noting that the utility requirement ensures that patents benefit the public).
280. See Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 367-68 (1873).
281. See Seymore, supra note 279, at 1052 (noting that operability “is de minimis because
an invention is inoperable only if it is ‘totally incapable of achieving a useful result’” (quoting
Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992))).
282. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Doug Lichtman & Mark
A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 53-56 (2007)
(exploring limitations on the extent and quality of USPTO review); Sean B. Seymore, Patent-
ly Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1500-02 (2011) (stating the two-step test used by the
USPTO for operability).
283. See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (using the modern analytical
approach to utility); Seymore, supra note 282, at 1501-02 (“[T]he examiner must establish a
prima facie case of unpatentability by coming forward with factual evidence of noncredi-
bility.”).
284. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 61, § 2107.01 (“Situations
where an invention is found to be ‘inoperative’ and therefore lacking in utility are rare, and
rejections maintained solely on this ground by a federal court even rarer.”).
285. See Seymore, supra note 279, at 1050-51 (arguing that a heightened utility require-
ment (which includes operability) has negative implications for patent law).
286. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 107, at 212-13 (suggesting that the lax utility
requirement allows the screening out of clearly inoperable inventions at low cost, and leaves
the market to winnow out the rest).
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However, operability should have an expanded role for patents
acquired primarily for their signaling value. If surgeons are ac-
quiring surgical method patents to signal something to the broad-
er community about their technical skill, their innovativeness, or
their investment potential, whether that inventive surgical method
is viable is very important. Patents can be signals only to the extent
that they are better indicators of some underlying, difficult-to-assess
value than other signals.287 Therefore, if patents are to serve a pure-
ly signaling function, we ought to care that the signal they convey
is accurate.
To improve operability, I suggest that the USPTO loosen the pre-
sumption that patent applications work as described.288 However,
I would suggest making this procedural change to examination only
for those patents that have a demonstrably high level of nonexclud-
able patents.289 Eliminating the presumption of operability will en-
able patent examiners to file initial rejections for patents they sus-
pect to be inoperable, unless the patent applicant can produce some
affirmative evidence of the patent’s operability.290 
This procedural change to patent examination acknowledges the
appeal of patents that have limited ability to exclude. Patentees
that seek these sorts of patents do so with an eye towards the
signaling value that a patent possesses. These patentees desire the
status that a government-issued patent confers on its owner.
However, the targets of these signals may differ in sophistication.
For example, the sophistication of a venture capital firm that relies
287. See Long, supra note 1, at 679 (arguing that patents may “convey credible information
at low cost to observers and reduce informational asymmetries between firms and investors”).
288. This would change the approach to operability, announced in In re Brana, 51 F.3d
1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing the strong presumption in favor of a patentee’s claims of
operability and utility).
289. Aside from surgical method patents, other areas of patenting that may have large
amounts of signaling value are mass consumer goods. See Anderson, supra note 87, at 1593-94
(highlighting the use of patents as marketing tools in the automotive industry); Sukhatme &
Bloche, supra note 87, at 975-76 (arguing that there is a value to consumer products in stating
that the item is “patent- protected”).
290. For a suggestion of similar doctrinal change (albeit for very different reasons), see
generally Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and
Intellectual Property: A Survey of the Literature (With an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches),
in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S.
Menell & David Schwartz eds., Edward Elgar 2019); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System
and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 301 (2011).
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on patent counts as a proxy for the inventiveness of a company in
which they are considering investing differs drastically from the
sophistication of a patient who selects a doctor because he has
patents hanging on his office wall. Eliminating the presumption of
patentability in areas that have a high signaling value to consum-
ers would be one way to reduce the use of the USPTO as a means of
false advertising.291
Of course, one might argue that this proposed change to the
presumption of operability will raise the cost of acquiring a patent,
as proving an invention’s operability can be quite costly in some
cases.292 In areas in which the signaling value of patents is low,
there is no need to closely examine the operability of inventions. In
the surgical method field, for instance, this procedural change to
patent examination procedures is likely to introduce substantial
new costs to patenting. However, those costs will benefit the public
by ensuring patents obtained primarily for their signaling value
are accurately conveying the efficacy of their inventions to the pub-
lic.
New surgical procedures are not subject to the heavy regulatory
schemes that new prescription drugs are,293 and there is no regula-
tory agency that supervises new surgical techniques like there is
for new drugs or medical devices.294 New surgical procedures “are
often launched ... on the basis of clinical theories ... [or] weak human
[studies] from which no causal inferences should be made.”295 Thus,
291. Of course, one might ask what the specific areas are where the signaling value of
patents is high. This Article has identified one such area (surgical method patents), but
further research is needed to identify other areas with this same quality.
292. See In re Citron, 325 F.2d 248, 251-53 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (rejecting a patent for a cancer
treatment, finding the evidence—which included analytical data and a working example that
demonstrated the effectiveness of the treatment in rats and humans—insufficient to support
the patient’s operability claims); see also Seymore, supra note 279, at 1055-57 (discussing In
re Citron as an illustration of the “heavy burden” that therapeutic inventions had to overcome
under the court’s [mid-twentieth century] operability jurisprudence).
293. See C M Ashton et al., Ethics and Methods in Surgical Trials, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 579,
579-80 (2009) (making the case for rigorous randomized trials of new invasive therapeutic
procedures).
294. The U.S. Food & Drug Administration oversees approval of new prescription drugs
and new medical devices. Learn About Drug and Device Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Jun. 18, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-drug-and-device-approvals [https://
perma.cc/L8RK-MKFK].
295. Ashton et al., supra note 293, at 579 (“Conversely, new invasive therapeutic pro-
cedures are often launched and widely disseminated on the basis of clinical theories emerging
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if one desires a patent for a new surgical method, the USPTO would
be wise to demand more proof of the procedure’s efficacy. If issued
patents are being used to signal something about the patented
method’s efficacy or safety, the USPTO ought to know something
about those things. This change would not transform the USPTO
into a regulatory agency, à la the FDA, however. It would merely
place on the patent applicant the burden of proving that the method
works in the way in which they claim. In the absence of a true
regulatory agency demanding definitive proof of the operability of
new surgical techniques,296 the USPTO should alter the presump-
tion of operability for signaling patents, such as surgical method
patents.
2. Radical Changes to the Patent System
A more radical change to the current patent system would be to
create a separate patent-like grant that lacks any rights to exclude.
In this way, traditional patents (those with a right to exclude) could
be separated from signaling and personhood patents (those without
the right to exclude). Viewing patents as signals rather than as
exclusive rights is a radical rethinking of why we have the patent
system in the first place.297 So, too, for patents obtained for their
personhood interest. Some may argue that instead of tweaking the
existing patent system to better accommodate these patents, we
should design a system that is explicitly about signaling or person-
hood.298
from laboratory research, clinicopathological correlations and weak human study designs from
which no causal inferences should be made, with no regulatory body in charge of predis-
semination oversight.”).
296. See id. at 579-80.
297. See Long, supra note 1, at 625-27.
298. For a fuller discussion about alternatives to the patent system, see Stephanie
Plamondon Bair & Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Anti-Innovation Norms, 112 NW. U. L. REV.
1069, 1131-35 (2018). Others have called for alternatives to the patent system. For example,
Ted Sichelman has called for a new “commercialization patent” in order to encourage the
commercialization of patented technologies. Sichelman, supra note 81, at 400-10. According
to Sichelman’s proposal, one way in which commercialization patents would differ from
traditional patents is that they would only last for five to eight years, id. at 408, and they
would have both negative rights to exclude and positive rights to commercialize the invention,
id. at 406-07.
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A new regime that allows inventors the signaling effects of the
patent system but does not have the same exclusionary rights of the
patent system has some intuitive appeal. After all, inventors may
prefer a system that is explicitly about signaling because such a
system furthers the interests of someone wishing to obtain the
nonpecuniary benefits of the patent system. Such signaling patents
would likely be less costly, as examination of unenforceable patent-
like rights would require fewer resources. It also would be cleaner
to apply this higher-operability standard with a new regime rather
than trying to force it, somewhat uncomfortably, into the tradition-
al patent system.
Ultimately, however, Congress is unlikely to adopt an alternative
to the patent system that specifically caters to those desirous to
signal their inventiveness to investors.299 Similarly, Congress is
highly unlikely to adopt a system that caters to surgeons seeking to
further their persona via property rights. There are good reasons,
beyond not wanting to disrupt the current patent system, for
Congress’s hesitation in creating an alternative system. Such a
signaling patent system—a system in which all signaling patents
lack the right to exclude—would effectively be a regime regulating
false advertising. Because signaling patents would do no more than
signal something about the patentee to the world, a system that
regulates issuance of such patents is regulating the truthfulness of
the signal.
However, there is already a system for regulating false advertis-
ing.300 The Lanham Act, enacted in 1946 and amended several times
since, establishes a private cause of action for false advertising.301
Congress confirmed by amendment that the Lanham Act bars both
false statements about an advertiser’s own goods or services and
299. But see Sichelman, supra note 81, at 395-96 (“Patent scholars have generally been
opposed to proposals for new forms of IP rights for a variety of reasons: they are costly and
difficult to implement; needlessly create complexity; encourage legislative rent-seeking; and
provide an additional layer of rights when most in the field believe that a contraction of rights
is in order.”).
300. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and
False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1309-13 (2011) (presenting a brief history of
the Lanham Act, the principal way that false advertising is regulated).
301. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2012). The Lanham Act also establishes federal
trademark law.
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false statements about another’s goods or services.302 Introducing a
wholly new scheme to regulate false claims (or false patents, as the
case may be) would only confuse the law.303 Ultimately, I am du-
bious that a new regulatory regime is needed for signaling patents
or personhood patents. Much of the work to accommodate such
patents exists in extant, though underused, doctrines.304
Others may take a different line of attack on the current patent
system in light of this Article’s findings. If patents are meant to
encourage inventors by offering the right to exclude others, then
there should not be patents without that right. Some commentators
have even suggested that offering surgical method patents while
disallowing enforcement amounts to a taking of the property rights
acquired in the patent.305 Therefore, surgical method patents ought
not to issue in the first place.306 Katherine Strandburg has made a
softer version of this same argument. Strandburg has suggested
that surgeon-inventors’ underuse of the patent system is actually a
good thing for the medical community.307 Because surgeons do not
need the patent system to motivate the invention of novel surgical
procedures, there is no need for the patent system to offer a right to
exclude in this area.308 Thus, to Strandburg, § 287 makes sense:
offering enforceable patents in an area that has other mechanisms
302. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)-(B).
303. This is not to suggest that false advertising law does not already have its critics. See
Tushnet, supra note 300, at 1374-82 (listing the many faults of modern false advertising law,
with particular attention paid to the standing doctrine’s effect on the law).
304. For further discussion of one of the underused doctrines that could be employed
towards policing signaling and personhood patents, see supra Section III.B.1.
305. See Scott D. Anderson, Comment, A Right Without a Remedy: The Unenforceable
Medical Procedure Patent, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 117, 141-44 (1999) (arguing that
§ 287(c) constitutes a taking).
306. See Leisa Talbert Peschel, Revisiting the Compromise of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 16 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 299, 323 (2008) (“Thus, on balance, removing medical and surgical pro-
cedures from the scope of patentable subject matter provides the most appropriate solution
to this controversy.”).
307. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Derogatory to Professional Character? The Evolution of
Physician Anti-Patenting Norms, in CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMP-
TIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 63, 79 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017)
(hypothesizing that the medical profession is opposed to surgical method patents because the
profession wants to preserve the norm of sharing).
308. See id. at 79-80. As this Article has demonstrated, sometimes those motivations may
come from within the existing patent system. Thus, to the extent that Strandburg and I
disagree, our disagreement is confined to whether the patent system ought to award patents
that are nonexcludable: I would say yes, I suspect Strandburg might say no.
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of incentivizing invention is the sort of thing Congress should be
doing more often.309
I tend to agree with Strandburg. However, I would add that al-
though some surgeon-inventors do not rely on the patent system for
motivation to invent, others do.310 Moreover, that use of the patent
system has added benefits: principally, the disclosure that comes
from the patent system.311 You might say that Strandburg’s position
is that of an incentive-to-invent theorist: if the invention is already
occurring, there is no reason (from society’s perspective) to offer a
patent. Whereas my position comes from a disclosure theorist’s
perspective: the patent is an enticement for the public disclosure of
how the invention operates.312 Ultimately, our two views are not
conflicting but complementary. While Strandburg points out that
§ 287(c) is a net positive for society, I point out that where surgeon-
inventors value the signaling effects of a patent, they still seek
patents despite their limitations and costs of patenting. I do not
think inventors who want to patent their surgical method inven-
tions should be denied the opportunity to do so. They have their
reasons for voluntarily disclosing their inventions to the public;
society should not stand in the way.
CONCLUSION
All three major theories of the patent system presuppose that
inventors desire a patent’s right to exclude. However, in the field of
surgical methods, numerous inventors obtain patents that do not
have any realistic right to exclude. This Article has advanced two
theories for why patentees obtain these patents: signaling theory
and personhood theory. First, under signaling theory, inventors
obtain nonexcludable patents to send some signal to a third party
about themselves or the surgical method. The patent could signal
309. Id. at 81 (suggesting that other types of patents, such as tax method, business method,
and software patents, are good areas to study whether a § 278-like exemption would be
beneficial).
310. See supra notes 55-59 and text accompanying.
311. See supra notes 60-65 and text accompanying.
312. Although I identify more with the incentive-to-invent theorists, I recognize that
disclosure theory has some explanatory power that incentive-to-invent does not, and vice
versa.
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that the inventor is an innovator and that signal may lead to
lucrative opportunities in which the patentee is able to monetize the
patent despite the patent’s inability to exclude. Alternatively, the
patent may signal to the inventor’s employer that the invention is
noteworthy, which may in turn lead to tenure or some other pro-
fessional goal. Alternatively still, the patent may attract clients for
the surgeon’s novel technique.
Second, personhood theory provides alternative answers as to
why an inventor would purposively obtain a nonexcludable patent.
This theory proposes that human flourishing is the goal behind
property in general.313 Patents, even unenforceable ones, may
encourage the flourishing of personality that is tied up in inven-
tiveness. Personhood theorists assert that property rights are
established so that humans can allow their personas to be fully
realized. For surgeons, often their persona is centered on the idea
that they are someone who creates new and innovative surgical
techniques. Thus, while some of these patents are not enforceable
against infringers (and therefore assumed to be worthless), the
patents’ value to their inventors is not measurable by the ability to
exclude others.
The existence of signaling patents (patents that are only obtained
for their ability to signal a characteristic about the invention or
inventor) and personhood patents (patents that are only obtained
for furthering their inventor’s persona) upsets nearly all extant
theories of patent law. Future research may provide further insight
into why inventors value such signaling or personhood patents.
However, the very existence of such patents destabilizes the ex-
clusive rights theories that have traditionally dominated patent
scholarship.
313. See HEGEL, supra note 30, at 52; Radin, supra note 31, at 957 (proposing a personhood
theory of property, wherein some control over resources in a person’s external environment
is necessary to proper self-development and noting how such a theory is often implicit in court
opinions and commentaries, yet ignored in legal thought).
